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From: stevens@prodigal.psych.rochester.edu (Greg Stevens)
Subject: Re: Is time continuous?
Message-ID: <1995Mar10.220818.22167@galileo.cc.rochester.edu>
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Date: Fri, 10 Mar 95 22:08:18 GMT
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In <Tim.Sprod-1003951315330001@mg1_48.educ.utas.edu.au> Tim.Sprod@educ.utas.edu.au (Tim Sprod) writes:
>In article <1995Mar2.044410.9376@galileo.cc.rochester.edu>,
>stevens@prodigal.psych.rochester.edu (Greg Stevens) wrote:

>> Let: Px = thing x has percpetual characteristics
>>      Ex = thing x exists
>>      Tx = there is a term clumping perceptual characteristics and calling 
>>           them by the name x.

>> I claimed: (Ex -> Px)  

>> 1. (Ex -> Tx), that is, for us to say that something exists, we must
>>                 have a term for it. ***

>This is the premise that can be denied. It says literally: 

>"That thing x exists implies that there is a term clumping perceptual
>characteristics and calling them by the name x."

>You have paraphrased it to say:

>"That we can say that thing x exists implies that there is a term clumping
>perceptual characteristics and calling them by the name x."

>The paraphrase is a tautology because you have slipped in the "we can
>say".

But I address this in the following note in my original post, which you
made no comments after:

>> *** NOTE: The line of argument that something can exist without us saying
>>           or being able to say that it exists is absurd, because the term
>>           "existence" is a human linguistic construct, that is, it itself
>>           is a term which catagorizes.  That is like saying that there
>>           are things which are red which will under no conditions appear
>>           red to us -- it is ridiculus because we, as the originators of
>>           the language, specify the conditions of applicability of the term.
>>           Thus, if we are not aware of something, we can not apply any term
>>           to it defining it as an "object," as distinguished from anything
>>           else.

You say I take the idea of social constructivism "too far" but I am in
fact not denying that there is a "reality" independent of observation;
I am denying that reality has proprties such as inherent divisions into
objects independent of observation.  The division between object and
background would be hard to establish as an objective thing, considering
that 1) we can divide the same space in many different ways and 2) when
you get your resolution strong enough even we have a hard time distinguishing
between bits-of-mass-energy-making-up-the-carpet vs. bits-of-mass-energy-
NOT-making-up-the-carpet.  Where could this distinction "fundamentally"
dividing space be found, objectively?  

So in my claim that Ex -> Tx, I am in fact recognizing humans' active
roles in catagorizing the world around us.  I thought this was something 
more or less biologically established ever since people recognized that
vision isn't the mere input of passive information from light -- the
retina constructs, and later stages of neurological processing construct
from that.  

Basically, I'm not saying there isn't a reality without observers, I'm saying
there isn't "objectness" without observers.

Greg Stevens

stevens@prodigal.psych.rochester.edu
 
