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From: zeleny@oak.math.ucla.edu (Michael Zeleny)
Subject: Re: Penrose's new book
Message-ID: <1994Oct18.110514.16731@math.ucla.edu>
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Date: Tue, 18 Oct 94 11:05:14 GMT
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In article <37v6ac$pa8@lyra.csx.cam.ac.uk> 
mh10006@cl.cam.ac.uk (Mark Humphrys) writes:

>In article <37lo0o$p81@toves.cs.city.ac.uk>, 
>jampel@cs.city.ac.uk (Michael Jampel) writes:

>> And in fact Penrose comes to the opposite conclusion from Lucas. Lucas
>> distinguished between a machine and a construction (I think these are
>> the terms he used). He defined a machine as a construction which is
>> deterministic, predictable, etc. He then suggested that such a machine
>> would not be able to cope with Goedel, and hence would not be
>> intelligent. BUT, he says, humans CAN construct non-deterministic
>> constructions which COULD cope with Goedel and so be intelligent. It's
>> just that they would not be `dumb' machines in the sense that a car is
>> a machine. So Lucas seems to be saying ``An intelligent machine would
>> not be predictable'' which is a pretty reasonable thing to say, however
>> he reached that conclusion.

>It is indeed.
>Does Penrose deal with genetic algorithms, reinforcement learning,
>behavior-based AI, etc. in his new book?

Yes.

>He didn't seem aware that such things existed last time.

He does not have to be aware of their existence to deal with them.

>If I was interested in AI systems based on symbols and logic,
>I might (or might not) be interested in Godel's theorem and all that.
>But I can't see what it has to say about
>some mess of an evolved artificial neural net,
>undesigned, not guaranteed to be without errors and flaws,
>and about which nothing much can be said other than it worked better
>than the other messes.

If it can be modelled by mathematical means, it falls within the
purview of logic.  Which only goes to show that everything falls
within the purview of logic.

>How come popular critics of AI never seem to read in the above fields?

How come the artificial intelligentsia invariably lack awareness of logic?

>'Emperor's' has a whole section called 'NATURAL SELECTION OF ALGORITHMS?'
>which is basically just Penrose revealing in great detail how he's
>never heard of GA's.

Suitable modifications of Goedel's argument can be promulgated in any
discipline whose language honors suitable closure principles.  There
is a neat example of one such application to inductive logic in Hilary
Putnam's latest collection of papers.  More to the point, it will of
necessity apply to the mathematical description of any mechanical
device whatsoever, regardless of its construction or provenance.

>Mark Humphrys
>Computer Laboratory
>University of Cambridge

cordially,                                                    don't
mikhail zeleny@math.ucla.edu                                  tread
writing from the disneyland of formal philosophy                 on
"Le cul des femmes est monotone comme l'esprit des hommes."      me
