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From: markrose@spss.com (Mark Rosenfelder)
Subject: Re: Objective access to the subjective
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Date: Thu, 8 Dec 1994 23:47:09 GMT
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In article <3c2ntg$43h@agate.berkeley.edu>,
Gerardo Browne <jerrybro@uclink2.berkeley.edu> wrote:
>Mark Rosenfelder (markrose@spss.com) wrote:
>: As recounted in _Color for Philosophers_, color scientists do
>: study peoples' subjective impressions (e.g. reports on whether they've seen
>: a light or not; whether two color samples match; what primary colors a light
>: consists of; what the prototypical example of a particular color term is);
>: and they've made progress in linking such judgments to physiological
>: facts about the brain.  Why shouldn't such methods eventually be applicable 
>: to consciousness or thought as well?
>
>Sure, the method of measuring via reports can be done, but it's
>important to realize the fundamental difference from measuring with
>instruments.  We can measure physiological facts about the brain, and we
>can also link these to reports.  But suppose the measurements on my own
>brain tell me that I see red, when I personally am quite sure I am
>seeing orange, not red.  I always come out on top in any argument with
>instruments, because of what it *means* to see red.  Whereas if I
>weigh something in my hand, and think it's around 10 pounds, while
>all scales rate it at 20 pounds, then it is always the instruments
>that must ultimately win the argument, because of what it *means*
>to weigh 20 pounds.

If you're simply saying that red is the name of a sensation, not a property
of external objects, I agree; this is simply a corollary of saying that
we're looking at subjective rather than objective properties.

I'm not sure what you mean, however, when you talk about being certain
you are seeing orange when "the measurements" say you're seeing red.
I can only see a few possibilities to explain such a result:

a. The measuring apparatus failed.  
b. The researcher is measuring the wrong thing.  For instance, perhaps he's
measuring the red/green opponent response in the retina.  But very possibly
other processes farther back in the brain change the color perceived to
orange; no problem.  
c. You're mistaken about perceiving orange.  Some people would maintain that
this is theoretically impossible; but others would argue.  
d. Due to an ununusal upbringing, you happen to refer to your own unique red
(the color seen when the red/green response is in the red range, and the
yellow/blue response is neutral) as "orange".

But in the first two cases it would be more accurate to say that the measurement
saying that you're seeing red is incorrect; and in the last cases it would
be more accurate to say that it's not certain that you're seeing orange.
If you want to maintain both halves of the supposition, the only refuge,
it seems to me, is dualism.
