Newsgroups: sci.skeptic,sci.psychology,sci.physics,sci.philosophy.meta,sci.bio,rec.arts.books,comp.ai.philosophy,alt.consciousness
Path: cantaloupe.srv.cs.cmu.edu!das-news2.harvard.edu!news2.near.net!howland.reston.ans.net!ix.netcom.com!netcom.com!jqb
From: jqb@netcom.com (Jim Balter)
Subject: Re: Why scientists popularize premature speculations?
Message-ID: <jqbD0EyGE.HJz@netcom.com>
Organization: NETCOM On-line Communication Services (408 261-4700 guest)
References: <JMC.94Dec3140227@white.wisdom.weizmann.ac.il> <D0CorF.I4t@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca> <jqbD0Dx14.156@netcom.com> <D0Erpt.5rK@cogsci.ed.ac.uk>
Distribution: inet
Date: Tue, 6 Dec 1994 23:55:25 GMT
Lines: 46
Xref: glinda.oz.cs.cmu.edu sci.skeptic:97350 sci.psychology:31092 sci.physics:102608 sci.philosophy.meta:15369 sci.bio:23771 comp.ai.philosophy:23296

In article <D0Erpt.5rK@cogsci.ed.ac.uk>,
Jeff Dalton <jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk> wrote:
>In article <jqbD0Dx14.156@netcom.com> jqb@netcom.com (Jim Balter) writes:
>>In article <D0CorF.I4t@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca>,
>>Andrzej Pindor <pindor@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca> wrote:
>
>>>The problem here is that consciousness is unlike other problems to which we
>>>apply scientific methods. Scientific methods are applied to the world
>>>reaching us through our senses whereas consciousnes is a phenomenon about
>>>which we have knowledge without senses - we _know_ that we are conscious,
>>>without involving sight, hearing, etc. Hence I doubt if scientific method is
>>>suitable to studying consciousness understood this way.
>>
>>It seems to me that the perception of our own thoughts can be thought of as
>>a sixth sense.  Unfortunately, it is as though each of us is sealed in a
>>room.  We can each sense what is in our own room, but not anyone else's room.
>>Additionally, we cannot bring any measuring instruments into the room.
>>This makes the usual methods of science unavailable.
>
>I agree with both paragraphs above (though I still feel science can
>get moderately close).
>
>However, I'm a bit surprised that Jim Balter is not saying that
>consciousness and perhaps even perception of one's own thoughts
>are ill-defined, vague, etc.  My "internal dialogue" is always
>unacceptable to him, but "perception of our own thoughts" is ok?

No, Jeff, I ask you what you mean by it, and why it is necessary or appropriate
as a measure or requirement for intelligence or whatever it is that you think
the TT is insufficient for that day.  Of course I think that consciousness
and perception of one's own thoughts are ill-defined and vague.  That's
why I said "seems" and "as though" and used an analogy to try to paint
a picture of what I had in mind.  To try to communicate and clarify.

Even if we have some shared *sense* of what we mean by "internal dialog" in
humans, as an *experience* or *perception*, that does not tell us what we mean
by it, in such a way that we can talk about whether a robot has it by
examining the robot; we have no idea what to look for.  The only examination
we can make of the robot for such "internal dialog" is to *ask it questions*
and *get reports*, just as Mark mentions in re _Color For Philosophers_ in his
response to my statement above.  I.e., textual exchange.  This is the sense in
which your "internal dialog" is unacceptable to me, as a thing in itself that
can be tested for by examination.  Do you understand my point yet, Jeff?  Or
are you once again focus on the heat of our exchange and ignore the substance?
-- 
<J Q B>
