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From: jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton)
Subject: Re: CR denies computer addition? (was Re: Penrose and Searle)
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In article <D062F0.FCK@festival.ed.ac.uk> cam@castle.ed.ac.uk (Chris Malcolm) writes:
>In article <Czzosp.Br5@cogsci.ed.ac.uk> jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) writes:
>>In article <Czu5zD.Dto@festival.ed.ac.uk> cam@castle.ed.ac.uk (Chris Malcolm) writes:
>>>In article <JMC.94Nov22011226@white.wisdom.weizmann.ac.il> jmc@white.wisdom.weizmann.ac.il (McCarthy John) writes:
>
>>>>Imagine that the procedure that the man in the Chinese room were performing
>>>>unbeknownst to him were simulating an abacus rather than translating Chinese.
>>>>Would the Searle argument then prove that a machine can't do arithmetic?
>
>>>Yes. The interesting point is that we are (nearly all of us) happy to
>>>extend the meaing of "add" to include what calculators do, but not (so
>>>many of us) to extend "understanding" to computers which get the
>>>behaviour right.
>
>>Bull.

Chris, you're distorting my point by leaving out the part of your
article that did the most to get me to say "Bull".  Here it is back:

  "Adding" is a low level menial activity that we are quite happy to
  consign to serfs such as clerks and calculators. On the other hand,
  "understanding" is something we all feel rather proud of, one of our
  unique distinguishing characteristics, so we are more defensive about
  it.

>>>In principle you are quite right. The Chinese Room argument implies
>>>that calculators do not add numbers,
>
>>No it doesn't.
>
>There is a strong interpretation of "understand", adopted by Searle,
>which necessarily includes the subjective feel of understanding. The
>CR argues that a computer running a program wouldn't have this. There
>is a weak interpretation of "understand", in which the possession of
>understanding is certified by the right behaviour. This is often (not
>quite correctly) considered to the Turing Test view. Searle denies
>that this is a valid interpretation of "understand". There is a
>middling interpretation which views understanding as getting the
>behaviour right by means of the right kind of internal machinery. This
>is (for example) the interpretation supposed by Brian Smith's
>Knowledge Representation Hypothesis.

I don't think this all turns on how we interpret "understand".  Let's
use 3 separate terms U-1 (Searle's), U-2 (B Smith's), and U-3 (Turing
Test).  No matter which camp gets to own "understand", we can ask how
various entities fare w.r.t. the several U-i.

>There are three corresponding interpretations of "semantics",
>"intentionality", and so on. While Brentano quite clearly meant the
>strong version in "Brentano's thesis" (that "intentionality is the
>ineliminable mark of the mental") it is often cited today in support
>of the two weaker versions.  An appropriately modified CR argument can
>be used to argue that just running the right program can't produce the
>strong version of these either.

Can you provide a bit more description of the versions of semantics?

>Although Searle originally intended his CR argument to show that
>running the right program couldn't cause strong understanding, in
>counter to Schank's claim that script systems displayed a minimal form
>of understanding, it is not clear that Schank meant to claim strong
>understanding in the first place. Searle offers as a corollary of the
>CR argument that you can't get semantics from (nothing but) syntax. Of
>course all that the CR justifies is the denial of strong semantics.

Do you think it justifies that?  That it works in that case?

>Similarly there is a strong, middling, and weak interpretation of
>addition. My point was that many people who take the strong
>interpretation of understanding are happy to adopt the weak
>interpretation of addition, in which case there is no problem with
>computers adding, but there is one with computers understanding (by
>means of running programs). But if one adopts the strong intepretation
>of addition, then a suitably modified CR proves that running the right
>program won't do it.

Well, there I disagree.  It can be argued that computers don't
perform additions.  They work with numerals or perhaps with 
"uninterpreted symbols" or something, whereas proper addition
involves numbers.  There are, presumably, argumants along those
lines.  But I don't agree that modified versions of the CR
show any such thing.

>I can't see any logical grounds for adopting the strong interpretation
>of "understand" and the weak of "addition" as the "proper"
>interpretations. It seems as arbitrary a choice as that which allows
>planes to fly but not submarines to swim. It is certainly sanctioned
>by popular usage in philosophical writing that "understanding" be
>interpreted strongly, "semantics" middlingly, and "addition" weakly.

I think "understand" is an especially poor choice, because it
offers endless opportunities for misunderstanding; but unfortunately
that's what Searle used.

I find that I don't care which camp gets to call their interpretation
of "understands" the proper one.  Rather than fight over this, why not
just consider the several cases?

>But I don't think this contingent linguistic fact constitutes a
>consistent philosophical view. If one adopts the strong interpretation
>of understanding then I can see no good reason for failing to adopt
>the strong interpretation of addition, and so arguing Searlishly that
>although getting the bit strings to come out right is the right
>behaviour, it crucially misses the subjective perception of number.

Is that all you mean by a modified CR argument, "it crucially misses
the subjective perception of number"?

I think subjective perception of number is a red herring, BTW.
So is "subjective feel of understanding".  Set aside the TT debate,
source of so much distortion.  Imagine something that miserably
fails to exhibit a behavioral understanding of what "dog" means.
Indeed, if you ask them they say "Yeah, you've got me.  It's
just a meaningless symbol to me, but I've picked up some of the
ways it's used in English and I thought I could get by."  Is
what this guy lacks the "subjective feel of understanding"?  

-- jeff
