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Article 4852 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: forbis@milton.u.washington.edu (Gary Forbis)
Subject: Re: A rock implements every FSA
Message-ID: <1992Mar31.205855.13140@u.washington.edu>
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Organization: University of Washington, Seattle
References: <1992Mar31.145015.12085@oracorp.com>
Date: Tue, 31 Mar 1992 20:58:55 GMT

In article <1992Mar31.145015.12085@oracorp.com> daryl@oracorp.com (Daryl McCullough) writes:
>I thought that the lookup table was the prime sort of thing that
>functionalism was supposed to rule out! If functionalism can't rule
>out humongous lookup tables, then what *does* it rule out? It seems
>that you want it to rule out rocks, but behaviorism already does that.

>I agree that it doesn't follow logically that functionalism reduces to
>behaviorism, but on the other hand, there seem to be no examples of
>systems that behaviorism allows but functionalism rules out.

When I first started considering the HLT some months ago I was willing to
bite the bullet and say it had qualia.  I have changed my mind.  I think
functionalism requires the behavior to be right as does behaviorism but
functionalism also requires something more.  It has been unclear to me
what that requirement was.  I think I have some insight into what *I* mean
by functionalism and what *I* think that requirement is.

When I use the term "functionally equivalent" I mean that all of the functions
I consider important are equivalent.  Behavior is a function.  Qualia is a
function.  If some system is to be functionally equivalent to the mind it must
have qualia.  If a physical device is to be functionally eqivalent to the
brain it must support a mind.

The way I use "functionalism" I mean to imply that if a device said to be 
functionally equivalent to another then any system which supervenes on these
devices and are part of the defining characteristics which leads one to call
the devices functionally equivalent must also be functionally equivalent.

As I understand behaviorism only the outside behavior is considered and not
the behavior of supervenient systems.  The HLT is behaviorally equivalent
to a human doing human things but the HLT is hollow.  It has no underlying
subsystems on which minde can supervene.  It is as if the brain did not
exist as a separate entity from the ear and the mouth.

Now if the HLT were broken down to interacting parts, I might begin to question
its ability to enable the underlying hardware to support a mind.  I feel the
mind exists because several physical devices are interrealted in the right
way.

If someone could tell me why my experience of qualia ends at my body's surface
I would be grateful.  I'm not sure why I experience a desk's surface 
differently when I touch it with my finger and when I touch it with 
an imagined extention of my finger.



>Daryl McCullough

--gary forbis@u.washington.edu


