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Article 4803 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: rickert@mp.cs.niu.edu (Neil Rickert)
Subject: Re: Language as Technology: A Phenomenological Study
Message-ID: <1992Mar29.172136.95@mp.cs.niu.edu>
Organization: Northern Illinois University
References: <1992Mar27.231937.14949@a.cs.okstate.edu> <1992Mar29.045831.14523@mp.cs.niu.edu> <1992Mar29.085440.24838@a.cs.okstate.edu>
Date: Sun, 29 Mar 1992 17:21:36 GMT
Lines: 52

In article <1992Mar29.085440.24838@a.cs.okstate.edu> onstott@a.cs.okstate.edu (ONSTOTT CHARLES OR) writes:
>In article <1992Mar29.045831.14523@mp.cs.niu.edu> rickert@mp.cs.niu.edu (Neil Rickert) writes:
>  Yes, but theory is something different than what I am talking about.
>Theory is the collective product of language use of a phenomenological
>observation.  Think of it as Karl Popper's world 3.  Theories are
>dependent on language which is dependent on intelligence.  Not the
>reverse.  Further, if one does NOT have a theory, it does not follow
>that one does NOT understand the world in which he lives, or the activites
>that he has.  However, it is true to say that a person who can not 

 But this is a rather limited view of understanding.  Biologically we are
close relatives of the chimpanzee.  If you remove our language capabilities
we would be much closer relatives.  Very likely our understanding of the
world would be similar to that of a chimp.

 We might understand that there is a regular rhythm from night to day,
but it is very doubtful we could understand ideas of planets revolving
around a central sun.

 Yes, without language we could understand our "world".  But it would be
a very different and much simpler "world" than the one we understand
with language.

>>>I have been using 'thinking'
>>>in terms of 'reacting,' 'working with,' 'appropriation,' of a creature
>>>and an environment in a dynamic way.  Intuition is generally beyond that
>>
>> This is a strange view of thinking.  Many mechanical contraptions would
>>meet this description, but I doubt you would consider them to be
>>thinking.
> They do not have thinking because they do not have worlds.  It requires
>a world to think.  If I were to remain strictly Heideggerian, I might

 Dave Chalmers likes to use the example of a thermostat, which he claims
has consciousness.  I think it is at least fair to say that the thermostat
has a world -- the rooms whose temperature it is attempting to
maintain -- and that it interacts with this world in a dynamic way.

 Personally I do not think of a simple thermostat as conscious or as
thinking.  On the other hand the thermostat I use is a digital one which
tries to do be a little more sophisticated.  I don't tend to think of it
as conscious, but I could make a case that it is conscious and does engage
in thought.  To avoid misleading you, let me add that the fact that it is
digital is not significant here, but the algorithm it uses is.  The fact
that it uses digital technology is, in the case, a mere implementation
detail.

-- 
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  Neil W. Rickert, Computer Science               <rickert@cs.niu.edu>
  Northern Illinois Univ.
  DeKalb, IL 60115                                   +1-815-753-6940


