From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!rpi!usc!wupost!uunet!mcsun!uknet!edcastle!aisb!aisb!smaill Tue Apr  7 23:22:40 EDT 1992
Article 4760 of comp.ai.philosophy:
Path: newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!rpi!usc!wupost!uunet!mcsun!uknet!edcastle!aisb!aisb!smaill
>From: smaill@aisb.ed.ac.uk (Alan Smaill)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Definition of understanding
Message-ID: <SMAILL.92Mar27141145@lomond.aisb.ed.ac.uk>
Date: 27 Mar 92 14:11:45 GMT
References: <SMAILL.92Mar11180313@lomond.aisb.ed.ac.uk> <6514@skye.ed.ac.uk>
	<SMAILL.92Mar25130113@sin.aisb.ed.ac.uk> <6529@skye.ed.ac.uk>
Sender: news@aisb.ed.ac.uk (Network News Administrator)
Organization: DAI, University of Edinburgh
Lines: 57
In-Reply-To: jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk's message of 26 Mar 92 21:44:00 GMT

In article <6529@skye.ed.ac.uk> jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) writes:

   In article <SMAILL.92Mar25130113@sin.aisb.ed.ac.uk> smaill@aisb.ed.ac.uk (Alan Smaill) writes:

   >However, the issue of the relation between third-person ascription of
   >mental attitudes ("she believes/understands X", and first-person
   >ascription ("I believe/understand X") is something that any convincing
   >account of how we achieve "meaning" should tackle.  Absolutely
   >privileging the first-person version seems to me to get this
   >relationship wrong.

   But there ought to be an asymmetry.  A theory that had people
   treating themselves from a third-person point of view would be wrong.

I do not claim that the relation is symmetric (it scarcely could be).
I agree that a theory that had people treating themselves _purely_
from a third-person point of view would be wrong.  This does not mean
that the first person view is never mistaken.

   >So, for having beliefs, the third person meaning involves acting
   >in a way consistent with the belief, eg trying to achieve goals
   >in ways that assume the truth of the belief. Now, if I consistently
   >tell myself and others over a period that I believe X, but achieve
   >my goals in ways that assume not X, could someone persuade me that
   >I had been wrong about believing X through this period, by pointing
   >out the inconsistency between my actions and my stated belief?

   Well, how, for instance?  Something like: "You say you believe
   in God, but I never see you pray, or go to church"?  Or: "you 
   say you believe planes are safe, but you never fly"?

Well, the first is always debatable, the second is better.  I say
sincerely I believe planes are safe.  So (normally) I believe I
believe planes are safe. But, being able to afford flying, I
nevertheless waste a lot of a lot of time travelling in other ways.

There might be a lot of explanations (I can't stand airline food, I
prefer the company of people who travel by train . . .). Given none of
these hold, perhaps I don't really believe planes are safe after all,
ie my belief that I believed planes are safe was wrong.  Perhaps I
work in the Pr department of an airline company and I had fooled
myself - (do you think people can fool themselves like this?).

   In any case, I don't think this sort of thing would apply in
   general to anyone who was running the Chinese Room and claimed
   not to understand Chinese.

I agree.  


   -- jeff

--
Alan Smaill,                       JANET: A.Smaill@uk.ac.ed             
Department of Artificial           ARPA:  A.Smaill%uk.ac.ed@nsfnet-relay.ac.uk
       Intelligence,               UUCP:  ...!uknet!ed.ac.uk!A.Smaill
Edinburgh University. 


