From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!rpi!think.com!yale.edu!spool.mu.edu!uunet!psinntp!scylla!daryl Tue Apr  7 23:22:23 EDT 1992
Article 4732 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: daryl@oracorp.com (Daryl McCullough)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: A rock implements every FSA
Message-ID: <1992Mar25.161024.2081@oracorp.com>
Date: 25 Mar 92 16:10:24 GMT
Article-I.D.: oracorp.1992Mar25.161024.2081
Organization: ORA Corporation
Lines: 26

I hate to admit this, but I think I agree with Mikhail Zeleny on this
point; Mikhail's arguments have convinced me that Putnam's proof does
make a certain amount of sense.

As several people have pointed out, the standard notion of
implementing a finite state machine involves getting the inputs and
outputs right, (which Putnam's rocks manifestly don't). However, that
notion of implementation is too strong if you want to say (a) that
"being conscious" means to implement a certain kind of state machine,
and (b) that sensation-deprived human brains are still conscious. The
problem with the latter case (imagine a deaf, blind, paralytic) is
that there are no inputs and outputs from the world possible, so
whatever it means to implement a conscious being cannot require
getting the *actual* inputs and outputs right.

If, on the other hand, you drop the input/output requirement, then
there is nothing to prevent a rock from implementing every FSM. I
don't see how Chalmer's complaints about counterfactuals is even a
problem. All that it takes to support counterfactuals is to be able to
show, for each possible input sequence, that there is a corresponding
trace of the states of the rock showing how the rock would have
responded if that input sequence had occurred.

Daryl McCullough
ORA Corp.
Ithaca, NY


