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Article 4723 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: smaill@aisb.ed.ac.uk (Alan Smaill)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Definition of understanding
Message-ID: <SMAILL.92Mar25130113@sin.aisb.ed.ac.uk>
Date: 25 Mar 92 13:01:13 GMT
References: <SMAILL.92Mar11120919@lomond.aisb.ed.ac.uk> <6381@skye.ed.ac.uk>
	<SMAILL.92Mar11180313@lomond.aisb.ed.ac.uk> <6514@skye.ed.ac.uk>
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In-Reply-To: jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk's message of 24 Mar 92 18:02:40 GMT

In article <6514@skye.ed.ac.uk> jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) writes:

   Re: Alan Smaill's:

     Is it not a problem if I believe I believe X, yet my actions
     only make sense assuming I really believe not X?  

   I'm no longer sure (if I ever was) how we got to beliefs about beliefs
   rather than just beliefs, but I would certainly agree that simple
   beliefs (1st order beliefs?) can be incorrect.  Indeed, as I noted
   elsewhere, someone who believed they understood Chinese could be
   wrong, as could someone who believed they didn't understand Chinese.
   (Or, avoiding such controversial areas, I might believe I have a
   five-pound note in my pocket and be wrong.)

   In any case, since beliefs can be wrong, it may be that beliefs
   about beliefs can be wrong.  At least I don't know how to rule out
   all possibliity of it.  

This was really the only point I was trying to make, as the opposite
had been argued.

   On the other hand: (1) The people who
   are trying to show they cannot be mistaken about their own beliefs
   may not actually have to show that; it may suffice to show that
   they cannot be mistaken about a certain class of beliefs. (2)
   In the particular cases we're discussing here, it still seems to
   me that they are not mistaken.

I for one do not suppose that this possibility is central to the CR
discussion. 

However, the issue of the relation between third-person ascription of
mental attitudes ("she believes/understands X", and first-person
ascription ("I believe/understand X") is something that any convincing
account of how we achieve "meaning" should tackle.  Absolutely
privileging the first-person version seems to me to get this
relationship wrong.

So, for having beliefs, the third person meaning involves acting
in a way consistent with the belief, eg trying to achieve goals
in ways that assume the truth of the belief. Now, if I consistently
tell myself and others over a period that I believe X, but achieve
my goals in ways that assume not X, could someone persuade me that
I had been wrong about believing X through this period, by pointing
out the inconsistency between my actions and my stated belief?
I don't want to rule this possibility out.



--
Alan Smaill,                       JANET: A.Smaill@uk.ac.ed             
Department of Artificial           ARPA:  A.Smaill%uk.ac.ed@nsfnet-relay.ac.uk
       Intelligence,               UUCP:  ...!uknet!ed.ac.uk!A.Smaill
Edinburgh University. 


