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Article 4693 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Definition of understanding
Message-ID: <6514@skye.ed.ac.uk>
Date: 24 Mar 92 18:02:40 GMT
References: <SMAILL.92Mar11120919@lomond.aisb.ed.ac.uk> <6381@skye.ed.ac.uk> <SMAILL.92Mar11180313@lomond.aisb.ed.ac.uk>
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Re: Alan Smaill's:

  Is it not a problem if I believe I believe X, yet my actions
  only make sense assuming I really believe not X?  

In article <SMAILL.92Mar11180313@lomond.aisb.ed.ac.uk> smaill@aisb.ed.ac.uk (Alan Smaill) writes:
>In article <6381@skye.ed.ac.uk> jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) writes:

>   >                                         I am then suggesting that
>   >this is a problem for those who think that they cannot be mistaken
>   >about their own beliefs.
>
>   What is the connection?  If someone believes X and acts like they
>   believe not-X, this does nothing whatsoever to show they are mistaken
>   in thinking they believe X (if that's indeed what they think).
>
>Well, the argument is not meant to be conclusive, but it is meant to
>say that there may be occasions where your beliefs about your own
>beliefs are not correct.

Thanks for the explanation and example.  I believe I now have a better
understanding of your point than before (and indeed, I believe that I
believe that), but I suppose I could be wrong.  But wrong about what,
excatly?  I'm not wrong in believing that I believe I have a better
understanding, because I do believe that I have a better understanding.
But it could be that I don't actually have a better understanding.
In short, my belief (that I have a better understanding) could be
wrong, but not my belief about my belief.  Something similar is
the case, I think, when beliefs seem to conflict with actions.

I'm no longer sure (if I ever was) how we got to beliefs about beliefs
rather than just beliefs, but I would certainly agree that simple
beliefs (1st order beliefs?) can be incorrect.  Indeed, as I noted
elsewhere, someone who believed they understood Chinese could be
wrong, as could someone who believed they didn't understand Chinese.
(Or, avoiding such controversial areas, I might believe I have a
five-pound note in my pocket and be wrong.)

In any case, since beliefs can be wrong, it may be that beliefs
about beliefs can be wrong.  At least I don't know how to rule out
all possibliity of it.  On the other hand: (1) The people who
are trying to show they cannot be mistaken about their own beliefs
may not actually have to show that; it may suffice to show that
they cannot be mistaken about a certain class of beliefs. (2)
In the particular cases we're discussing here, it still seems to
me that they are not mistaken.

>So suppose I persuade myself that I am not frightened of spiders.
>However, when confronted with a spider, I spontaneously 
>react with fear.  I may then say "I thought I wasn't
>afraid, but actually I was."  This seems a natural analysis
>(if not the only one), and it is ruled out if we think we are always
>correct in our beliefs about our beliefs.

I am not completely sure what you are identifying as the belief
about a belief in this example.  Perhaps through some formula
such as "a belief is a disposition to behave" you are identifying
some things as beliefs that I would not.  My analysis of this
example is as follows:

Before the enocunter with the spider, you believe you are not
afraid of spiders.  But you were wrong, you are afraid of spiders,
as you realize when confronted by one.  So, after this, you no
longer believe you are not afraid of spiders.  But you were
not mistaken in thinking, before the confrontation, that you
believed you were not afraid of spiders.  You really did believe
that (then).

-- jd


