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Article 4612 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: markrose@spss.com (Mark Rosenfelder)
Subject: Re: Definition of understanding
Message-ID: <1992Mar19.190039.35783@spss.com>
Date: Thu, 19 Mar 1992 19:00:39 GMT
References: <1992Mar17.210431.25318@oracorp.com> <6433@skye.ed.ac.uk>
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In article <6433@skye.ed.ac.uk> jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) writes
(quoting Daryl McCullough):
>>All of the arguments that have been advanced for why symbol-shuffling
>>cannot produce meaning depend on the external notion of meaning. It is
>>quite correct that internal rules for manipulating symbols can never
>>unambiguously pin down the external reference of those symbols.
>
>So how is it that humans manage to get "cats" to refer to cats,
>and not to cherries?  Or do we?

Good question.  Do we?

You and a robot each make the assertion, "Cats have sharp claws."  
Why is your statement, but not the robot's, a reference to cats?

Suppose a demon is living inside your head, watching your mental activity as
you make this statement.  Like Searle inside the Chinese Room, he is bored,
and starts interpreting the neural events around him as moves in a chess
game.  Are you still sure that you have an ability to refer unambiguously
to the external world?


