From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!rpi!usc!wupost!darwin.sura.net!convex!constellation!a.cs.okstate.edu!onstott Tue Mar 24 09:56:53 EST 1992
Article 4560 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: onstott@a.cs.okstate.edu (ONSTOTT CHARLES OR)
Subject: Re: Intelligence and Understanding
References: <1992Mar1.072408.25643@a.cs.okstate.edu> <1992Mar6.181656.7436@sun!kla> <g89a2582.700816441@alpha.ru.ac.za>
Message-ID: <1992Mar17.220247.1265@a.cs.okstate.edu>
Organization: Oklahoma State University, Computer Science, Stillwater
Date: Tue, 17 Mar 92 22:02:47 GMT
Lines: 161

In article <g89a2582.700816441@alpha.ru.ac.za> g89a2582@alpha.ru.ac.za (Gary Allemann) writes:
>In <1992Mar6.181656.7436@sun!kla> kla!zardoz@sun.com (Phillip Wayne) writes:
>
>>In article <1992Mar1.072408.25643@a.cs.okstate.edu> onstott@a.cs.okstate.edu (ONSTOTT CHARLES OR) writes:
>>>
>>>
>>[ deleted items ... ]
>
>>There are a LOT of problems with these "Propositions". I will attempt to
>>answer each.
>
>>>  First Proposition:
>>>   Truth can be obtained without understanding.  
>>>    Ex: 2+2=4=2+2 is TRUE however the operators + and = do not themselves
>>>    understand.
>
>>The "operators" are not (in the true sense, at least) operators. Rather, they
>>are the names of relations between the left and right hand side of the
>>equations. If you want to say that understanding is being a member of a
>>specific relation, then the operators do, indeed, understand.
>
>This is a weak argument and seems to support proposition 1. 2+2=4=2+2 is true
>precisely because the operators define relationships and it would be true 
>irrispective of the meaning given to the symbols 2, +, 4 and =. This is where
>the power of formal systems ( including deductive logic ) lies - truth is 
>independant of meaning or understanding. I suggest you read Hofstadter -
>"Godel, Escher, Bach - An Eternal Golden Braid" for a more detailed explanation. 
>>>  Second Proposition:
>>>   Understanding is a system relationship; but a particular kind of system.
>>>   For example, as can be derived from the first proposition, the truth
>>>   and the understanding to go with it requires that of which deems 
>>>   2+2=4=2+2 to be TRUE and Meaningful.  The understanding of that proposition
>>>   as True comes from the fact that True is itself meaningful.
>>>
>
>>If you define true as not meaningful, we can stop right here, since
>>true has no meaning. Truth with a capital T is the reign of religious
>>converts, politicians, and confidence men. If you want truth to mean
>>(and I take this as your meaning) that a specific, testable relationship
>>exits then you can not say that truth has no meaning. In other words,
>>you want to have it both ways. A != !A if you are dealing with normal
>>logic. You can't have it both ways.
>
>No where in Proposition 2 is true defined as not being meaningful. In fact the
>argument is attempting to point out that the relationship 2+2=4=2+2 is true only
>because we do give meaning to the word TRUE. Similarly, A != !A is TRUE.
>However, A != !A does not have meaning unless it is given meaning by us. We
>choose to give the symbol = the meaning 'is equal to' and the symbol ! the 
>meaning 'not' ( and all words the meanings that they are given ) but the 
>example you have chosen shows that truth is independant of meaning by using
>the meaningless symbol A to represent any proposition. 
>
>>>  Third Proposition:
>>>   Meaningfulness comes from volition.
>
>>So books (having no volition) have no meaning. Mathematics (having no
>>volition) has no meaning. Philosphy (having no volition) has no
>>meaning. Language (having no volition) has no meaning. Words (having
>>no volition) have no meaning. &c, &c, &c. 
>
>Yes - in themselves words and languages certainly have no inherent meaning.
>What is the meaning of the following sentence - Jy is 'n doos. It is a
>recognised language. Or the following word - ghoti. It has meaning to me
>but only because I give it meaning - not because the meaning is inherent. No
>other person would necessarily be forced to give it the same meaning. The power
>of cyphers lies in their having no universal meaning.
>
>>This just gets sillier as it goes along.`
>
>Yes - it does !
>
>>>   The system must have volition--in turn which means that it is
>>>   dynamic and creative.
>
>>By this definition, then, the earth's ecosystem (which it can not
>>be denied is both dynamic and creative) has volition. 
>
>>Sillier and sillier.
>
>>>
>>>  Fourth Proposition:
>>>   A computer does not have volition.  A computer does not have volition
>>>   because, even as a system, its behavior is presecribed and thus
>>>   predetermined.  
>
>>The contents of a computer can change many millions of times in a
>>second. Sounds pretty dynamic to me. Data structures are created and
>>destroyed many times during the life of a computer. So how come it
>>doesn't have volition, since it meets the criteria you formerly set
>>up for volition? 
>
>The criteria Mr  Onstott required for volition were both dynamism and 
>creativity - not just one of the above.
>
>>>
>>>  Fifth Proposition:
>>>
>>>   Predetermination denies volition which in turn denies meaning which
>>>   in turn denies understanding.
>
>>If, by this you mean that anything predetermined has neither creativity
>>nor dynamism, then, by your definition computers do not have predetermination.

  No, you have simply failed to establish how a computer has creativity.

>
>>>
>>>  Conclsion:
>>>   A computer, as a system, lacks volition and thus lacks understanding.
>
>>However, this is in complete disagreement with your own definitions of 
>>volition and understanding. You did not draw you conclusion from your
>>premises. You drew it from far left field.

  Might I suggest a class in logic.  The above conclusion is perfectly
consistant the aforesaid proposition.  Perhaps, you are out in far left
field.


>> 
>>>  OF COURSE, it could be said that a computer and a human working together
>>>  comprises a system of understanding.  However, this is not the question
>>>  at hand--the question is "Can the computer, by itself, understand?"
>>>  The answer is "no."
>
>>Once again, by your definitions, the computer is capable of understanding. 
>>So why is the answer no?

  I fail to see this conclusion of yours.  How do you surmise that my
definitions show that a computer is capable of understanding?


>
>>>  IF:
>>>
>>>   If you want to maintain that human has not volition; you also maintain
>>>   that a human produces nothing meaningful and in turn deny that
>>>   he has understanding.
>>>
>
>>Well, at least some of us produce something meaningfull. Others write
>>(and answer :-) articles like this.
>
  Granted, which shows the abusrdity of any claims such as the above.
The statement was rhetorical.

BCnya,
  Charles O. Onstott, III

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Charles O. Onstott, III                  P.O. Box 2386
Undergraduate in Philosophy              Stillwater, Ok  74076
Oklahoma State University                onstott@a.cs.okstate.edu


"The most abstract system of philosophy is, in its method and purpose, 
nothing more than an extremely ingenious combination of natural sounds."

                                              -- Carl G. Jung
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