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Article 4553 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: zeleny@zariski.harvard.edu (Mikhail Zeleny)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy,sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: Causes and Goals
Message-ID: <1992Mar18.104311.9986@husc3.harvard.edu>
Date: 18 Mar 92 15:43:07 GMT
Article-I.D.: husc3.1992Mar18.104311.9986
References: <1992Mar16.224536.2719@neptune.inf.ethz.ch> <1992Mar17.110436.9937@husc3.harvard.edu> <1992Mar18.044516.28882@nuscc.nus.sg>
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In article <1992Mar18.044516.28882@nuscc.nus.sg> 
smoliar@iss.nus.sg (stephen smoliar) writes:

>In article <1992Mar17.110436.9937@husc3.harvard.edu>
>zeleny@zariski.harvard.edu (Mikhail Zeleny) writes:

>>In article <1992Mar16.224536.2719@neptune.inf.ethz.ch> 
>>santas@inf.ethz.ch (Philip Santas) writes:

PS:
>>>Relevant things can be said for a cloud: One rain cloud, under
>>>certain atmospherical conditions brings rain, otherwise it
>>>moves peacefully to another place. 

MZ:
>>A cloud is not an agent.

SS:
>Appealing as this assertion is to the intuition, I would like to pursue an
>angle for questioning it.  My theme is basically a variation on the approach
>to models which Minsky took in "Matter, Mind, and Models" (which I recently
>cited and Marvin subsequently developed).  Just as the question of whether
>or not an entity A* constitutes a model of another entity A can only be
>resolved in the context of some postulated observer B, so I would argue
>that whether or not any entity X is an agent cannot be resolved in terms
>of necessary and sufficient conditions on the attributes of X.  Rather,
>one can only address whether or not a given observer Y is attributing agency
>to X.

Sure it can be so resolved: see any good text on philosophy of action, e.g.
O'Shaughnessy's "The Will".  Given the existence of viable theories of
agency that agree with my naive pre-theoretic intuitions thereof, I submit
that the burden of proof of non-existence of agency lies on the purveyors
of Dennetian "intentional stance" nonsense.

SS:
>The case of the cloud is a great example.  As far as anyone who seriously
>practices Hopi religion is concerned, a cloud is MOST DEFINITELY an agent;
>and much of Hopi ritual and ceremony is based on different aspects of agency
>attributed to clouds (particularly those clouds which are disposed to bring
>rain).  Since it seems a bit ethnocentric to dismiss the matter simply by
	 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>asserting that the Hopi mind cannot grasp the concept of agency (just as
 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>others have misinterpreted Hopi behavior to assert that they could not grasp
>the concept of time), the problem seems to reside in whether or not the agency
>of a cloud has anything to do with its being a cloud.  Consequently, we can
>observe individuals in different social contexts and, on the basis of the
>actions they take in those contexts, we may be better off hypothesizing what
>each of those individuals chooses to regard as agents.  As we observe more
>behavior, we may be obliged to modify our hypotheses;  but changes in the
>assertion of agency will reside in observing the behavior of the individuals,
>rather than observing the agents and non-agents with which they interact.

The Hopi mind that remains bound to its irrational tradition *hasn't*
grasped the concept of agency.  Feel free to join them; I hear a lot of
good things about the potlatch.  Perhaps they can give you some ideas about
constructing those NL parsers that, according to your buddy Marv's past
selves, we should have been enjoying by now.  In return, you could teach
them about criteria of agency, like volition and responsibility.

SS:
>Needless to say, one has to be very careful in the use of that word "entity."
>There are plenty of people out there who attribute agency to an agency which
>has no physical properties and is yet omnipresent and all-knowing.  Indeed,
>about the only properties this entity has are its agency and a name (which
>usually comes out something like "God" in English).  Since the agency of God
>seems critically linked to the behavior of such believers and since God has
>no other attributes by which we can decide whether or not it is an agent, then
>unless we decide that only atheists can make decisions about agency, it seems
>that we shall have to factor in observer behavior.  Then after we think we have
>the general case of agency in hand, we can worry about doing the same for
>Mikhail's noetic agency.

"Since the agency of automata seems critically linked to the behavior of
artificial intelligentsia, and since no existing automaton has any other
attributes by which we can decide whether or not it is an agent, then
unless we decide that only real philosophers can make decisions about
agency, it seems that we shall have to factor in observer behavior.  Then
after we think we have the general case of agency in hand, we can worry
about doing the same for understanding."

Sorry, but I don't buy that.  If you wish to claim a Copernican revolution
in philosophy, you would have to adduce a proof of a better foundation than
a few regurgitated Dennett--Minsky slogans.  The general case of agency has
been treated extensively by major philosophers over the past two and a half
millenia.  Its main problematics are well known, its criteria --- well
established.  If you wish to challenge this tradition, you have to address
it squarely, instead of dismissing it with faux naif homiletic appeals to
Hopi religion, and its "civilized" counterpart, politically correct
multiculturalism.  Should you wish to do that, I'll be happy to continue
this discussion; otherwise any such effort will remain as sterile as your
robots.  A good common ground for a starting place would be constituted by
the relevant articles in the Edwards' encyclopedia, a text that is surely
available in your local libraries.

MZ:
>>It is still highly questionable to what extent the laws of biology are
>>reducible to those of physics.  My own suspicion is that they aren't; see
>>on this Popper and Eccles' "The Self and Its Brain".

SS:
>I remember seeing this book back in 1981.  Unfortunately, in my current straits
>(pun sort of intended), I may have a bit of trouble getting myself a copy.  Can
>anyone take the trouble to summarize their basic argument as to why biology
>cannot be reduced to physics?  (I tend to agree with the conclusion at an
>intuitive level, but I would like something a bit more solid than my own
>feeble intuition.  I also wonder whether or not the converse might be the
>case:  that laws of physics may be reducible to laws of biology.)

Citing Peter Medawar's "A Geometric Model of Reduction and Emergence",
published in Ayala & Dobzhansky's "Studies in the Philosophy of Biology",
Popper suggests that the reduction of Ecology/Sociology => Biology =>
Chemistry => Physics is not one of logical reducibility, but comparable to
the relation between Metrical (Euclidean) Geometry => Affine Geometry =>
Projective Geometry => Topology, namely that of enrichment of each higher
geometrical discipline through a conservative extension of its deductive
structure; so all theorems of projective geometry are valid in a suitable
reformulation of metrical geometry in a language capable of employing the
concepts of the former discipline.  Naturally, this analogy depends on a
rejection of physical determinism.


`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'
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: Mikhail Zeleny                                                     :
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