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Article 4532 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: zeleny@zariski.harvard.edu (Mikhail Zeleny)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy,sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: A rock implements every FSA
Message-ID: <1992Mar17.222238.9969@husc3.harvard.edu>
Date: 18 Mar 92 03:22:29 GMT
References: <44855@dime.cs.umass.edu> <1992Mar17.014500.8635@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu> <44993@dime.cs.umass.edu>
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In article <44993@dime.cs.umass.edu> 
orourke@sophia.smith.edu (Joseph O'Rourke) writes:

>In article <1992Mar17.014500.8635@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu> 
>chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers) writes:

DC:
>  >[...](I'd hate to see it become folk wisdom that a rock
>  >implements any FSA, just through the claim being repeated enough
>  >times):

JO'R:
>It is not completely clear to me what Putnam himself thinks of his
>"theorem."  (It is odd, isn't it, that he calls it a "theorem"?  I
>feel this is a weakening of the force of the word "theorem.") 

Not really: see his equally mathematically trivial theorem in the appendix
to the "Reason, Truth and History".  Word has it that, whenever he gets a
substantive mathematical result, he calls it a lemma: see his seminal paper
with Boolos on the degrees of unsolvability in the constructible hierarchy,
in the 1968 JSL.

JO'R:
>								 In
>"Representation and Reality," he treats it more like "a rock 'implements'
>any FSA," with emphasis on the scare quotes around 'implements.'  He
>uses it mainly as a tool in his argument against functionalism.

Considering that, in spite of numerous claims to the contrary, no one has
so far managed to come up with a more restrictive, natural notion of
implementation, Putnam's use of scare quotes may be justifiable.  Compare
the situation with reference, as illuminated by the aforementioned theorem.

DC:
>  >My problems with Putnam's "proof" are roughly
>  >
>  >1. He sets it up so that the rock does indeed go through some actual
>  >sequence of states ABABAB... during a given time interval.  But an
>  >FSA must also satisfy counterfactuals [...]
>  >
>  >2. An FSA certainly must satisfy counterfactuals of the form "if
>  >in state S, input I had come in, then it would have transited to
>  >state T", for all counterfactual inputs I.  [...] As far as I can tell, 
>  >the required counterfactual sensitivity is entirely lacking.

I've said it once, I've said it a thousand times: whatever the laws that
guarantee the state-transitions of a FSA, the same laws guarantee the
state-transitions of a rock.  Since physical necessity is the same, so is
the counterfactual force.

JO'R:
>Putnam is well aware of the counterfactuals objection, and devotes pages
>96-105 of his book to refuting it.  But the refutation is curious.  He
>focuses exclusively on David Lewis's theory, which is perhaps not
>inappropriate since (a) Lewis wrote a paper in direct response to
>Putnam (a paper which I have not read), and (b) Lewis is Mr. Counterfactual
>if anyone is.

The paper in question (?) is rather weak; it is entitled "Putnam's
Paradox", and raises "naturalness" objections to what some impressionable
types have called "Putnam's Theorem", i.e. the model domain permutation
trick.  It is discussed at some length in Lakoff's book "Women, Fire, and
Dangerous Objects", and is one of the very few things the book's author
gets more or less right.  In my opinion, Lewis fails because of his heroic
decision to follow Putnam's refusal to dissolve the paradox by assigning
content to sentences and their constituents.  Notably, the paper is not
included into the second volume of its author's collected trivia, in spite
of being featured in its bibliography; it can be found in the 1984
Australasian Journal of Philosophy.

JO'R:
>	Putnam characterizes Lewis's theory of causality as having two
>main points (p. 96):
>
>	(1) Counterfactuals:  if "A caused B," then "if A had not been
>	the case, then B would not have occurred."
>
>	(2) The states cannot be arbitrary disjunctions (as in Putnam's
>	"proof"), but rather must satisfy some criteria of "naturalness."
>
>Putnam then argues that Lewis's theory does not hold up in various
>(to me) nebulous ways.  

On the contrary, his account quite reasonably suggests that possible-worlds
semantics is not a Universal Explanatory Paradigm; as for the notion of
"naturalness", the world still awaits its first cogent formulation.

JO'R:
>			But I think the upshot is that, if you (David
>Chalmers) want to reject Putnam's rock-theorem, then you have to be
>prepared to offer a theory of causality more robust than Lewis's possible
>worlds theory; or you have to find reason to reject his rebuttal of Lewis.
>To just say "counterfactual sensitivity is lacking" is not enough:
>Putnam well knows this.

I was really tempted to say that earlier this afternoon; thank you for
saving me from the burden of being a spoilsport this time around.

JO'R:
>	Of course, what I mean by "you have to" is: if you were to try to
>publish your theory in a reputable journal of philosophy.  And this
>may not be your goal at all.

Based on your interlocutor's earlier faux naif act with respect to the
alleged lack of philosophical arguments against the Systems Reply, I am
beginning to suspect that his goal consists in blowing the maximal amount
of hot air.  As a public service to those afflicted by a similar short-term
memory loss, I conclude by reposting my original article on that subject:

Article 3545 of sci.philosophy.tech:
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Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy,sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: Definition of understanding
Message-ID: <1992Feb28.064104.9265@husc3.harvard.edu>
>From: zeleny@brauer.harvard.edu (Mikhail Zeleny)
Date: 28 Feb 92 06:41:02 EST
References: <1992Feb23.044200.29383@mp.cs.niu.edu> <1992Feb23.015634.9079@husc3.harvard.edu> <1992Feb23.225938.17078@ida.liu.se>
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In article <1992Feb23.225938.17078@ida.liu.se> 
c89ponga@odalix.ida.liu.se (Pontus Gagge) writes:

>zeleny@zariski.harvard.edu (Mikhail Zeleny) writes:

>>In article <1992Feb23.044200.29383@mp.cs.niu.edu> 
>>rickert@mp.cs.niu.edu (Neil Rickert) writes:

PG:
>[The eternal Searle/Systems Reply debate continues]

MZ:
>>The fact that, in spite of having conducted interminable discussions on
>>this subject, you've yet to come up with a conclusive and persuasive
>>refutation of Searle's argument leaves me on the horns of a dilemma:
>
>>(i) Either you and your coreligionists lack the requisite eristic
>>*cleverness* needed in order to make a suitable impression on Searle's
>>public; 
>
>>or
>
>>(ii) The lack is in your abject failure to *understand* the argument.
>
>>In light of recent revelations of the vacuousness of the concepts of
>>reference and understanding, I suspect that (ii) is the case.

PG:
>There are of course three possibilites Mr. Zeleny ignores, namely that:
>
>(iii) "Eristic cleverness" is lacking on Searle et al.'s side.

Hardly so.  Searle may be lacking eloquence in comparison with Derrida, but
when it comes to the AI crowd, there's simply no contest.  Just look at
them scurrying around in the Boden anthology; they lose the battle before a
single shot is fired.  

PG:
>(iv) Mr. Zeleny & co' abjectly fail to understand the Systems Reply.

I can't think for the latter, but feel free to attempt a demonstration of
my personal failure.  Truth is, there's nothing to understand.
Incidentally, this is very nearly the answer to the Systems Reply.

PG:
>(v) Neither side understands the other's point of view.

Have you been reading Lacan lately?

Or was it Beckett?

PG:
>As I personally am less inclined than Mr. Zeleny to believe everybody else
>a fool (which is anyway rather an untenable position in this area, at
>least *generally* speaking); I suspect (v) is more it.

Unless you agree with the above luminaries that communication is
*generally* impossible (and the semantic eliminativism that is the
corollary of functionalism would surely force you to adopt that view), 
you can safely assume that this is not the case.

PG:
>OK, I will risk a continuation of the debate anyway. Mikhail, please help
>me. *What* is it that is insufficiently "conclusive and persuasive"
>about the Systems Reply? The "two minds in one cranium"? The implementation
>relation between them? I know this has been hashed out before; but I
>failed to see the pertinence of your objections. (Which is the reason:
>your eristic ability being insufficient, or my being a bloody fool?)

"Failing to see the pertinence of my objections" is hardly a valid
criticism.  Under the circumstances, the best I can do is recapitulate my
impertinence.  In short, personal identity presupposes continuity of memory
(this is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition thereof, but rather
the best we can do after two and a half millenia of philosophical inquiry),
as well as first-person access thereinto.  Another criterion of personal
identity consists in the felt continuity of volition, equally dependent on
a first-person view.  In other words, there exists no known way to
individuate persons without first granting their personhood, an assumption
that would beg the question of artificial intelligence.  Moreover, since
the conative criterion relies on the assumption of free agency, as well as
a first-person view, it is relevant that both of the latter are rejected by
AI theorists like Dennett (in his books "Elbow Room" and "Consciousness
Explained").  In other words, you are in no position to posit virtual
personhood without inventing a radical new criterion of personal identity.
Feel free to do so.

No person => no mind => no understanding.

`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'
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: Mikhail Zeleny                                                     :
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