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Article 4410 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: smaill@aisb.ed.ac.uk (Alan Smaill)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Definition of understanding
Message-ID: <SMAILL.92Mar11180313@lomond.aisb.ed.ac.uk>
Date: 11 Mar 92 18:03:13 GMT
References: <SMAILL.92Mar9215108@sin.aisb.ed.ac.uk> <6375@skye.ed.ac.uk>
	<SMAILL.92Mar11120919@lomond.aisb.ed.ac.uk> <6381@skye.ed.ac.uk>
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In-Reply-To: jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk's message of 11 Mar 92 16:26:12 GMT

In article <6381@skye.ed.ac.uk> jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) writes:

   >  AS:  >Is it not a problem if I believe I believe X, yet my actions
   >  AS:  >only make sense assuming I really believe not X?  
   >
   >   What does this mean?  Are you suggesting that no one could believe
   >   X and yet act like they believe not-X?

   BTW, I'm not sure it's ever the case that there's only one way to make
   sense of actions. 

Probably.

   >No, I'm suggesting that it is possible that someone can believe
   >X, and yet act like they believe not-X.  

   Ok, but why is this a problem?

This is not a problem. (I think I phrased the reply badly, it should have
been "someone can believe that they believe X, yet act like they
believe not-X".)


   >                                         I am then suggesting that
   >this is a problem for those who think that they cannot be mistaken
   >about their own beliefs.

   What is the connection?  If someone believes X and acts like they
   believe not-X, this does nothing whatsoever to show they are mistaken
   in thinking they believe X (if that's indeed what they think).


Well, the argument is not meant to be conclusive, but it is meant to
say that there may be occasions where your beliefs about your own
beliefs are not correct.  

So suppose I persuade myself that I am not frightened of spiders.
However, when confronted with a spider, I spontaneously 
react with fear.  I may then say "I thought I wasn't
afraid, but actually I was."  This seems a natural analysis
(if not the only one), and it is ruled out if we think we are always
correct in our beliefs about our beliefs.

--
Alan Smaill,                       JANET: A.Smaill@uk.ac.ed             
Department of Artificial           ARPA:  A.Smaill%uk.ac.ed@nsfnet-relay.ac.uk
       Intelligence,               UUCP:  ...!uknet!ed.ac.uk!A.Smaill
Edinburgh University. 


