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Article 4362 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: bill@NSMA.AriZonA.EdU (Bill Skaggs)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Definition of understanding
Message-ID: <1992Mar9.201433.26909@organpipe.uug.arizona.edu>
Date: 9 Mar 92 20:14:33 GMT
References: <1992Mar6.172308.15113@beaver.cs.washington.edu> <1992Mar6.223154.26703@psych.toronto.edu> <1992Mar7.010644.1466@beaver.cs.washington.edu> <1992Mar9.162941.1959@psych.toronto.edu>
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Reply-To: bill@NSMA.AriZonA.EdU (Bill Skaggs)
Organization: Center for Neural Systems, Memory, and Aging
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In article <1992Mar9.162941.1959@psych.toronto.edu> 
michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar) writes:
>
>Yes, I *do* believe that I have special access to my understanding, or
>at least to my *beliefs* about my understanding.  I *know* when I believe
>I understand Chinese.  I may be wrong that I in fact *do* understand it,
>but, unlike any other person, I cannot be wrong about my *belief* that
>I understand it.  I *do* stand in a privileged position with regard to
>my mental states.  (Otherwise, to use a favorite example, we'd need a doctor
>to tell us whether we were in pain or not.)
>
>If you wish to deny an individual privileged access to their mental states,
>fine, but it's going to take a *lot* of argument. 
>
  Let us consider what it means to believe something.

  Much of what we call thinking consists of internal conversations
we conduct with ourselves.  We silently "say" things and then
contemplate them.  "Believing" something means saying to oneself
that it is true.  "Knowing that one believes" something means
hearing one say to oneself that it is true.

  Can one, then, believe something without knowing one believes
it?  Normally not, because if one's mind is functioning correctly,
one's internal conversations are clear and comprehensible.  But
it is at least possible in principle, and may actually happen in
disordered states such as schizophrenia, where language is so
fractured that victims may not be able to conduct coherent internal
conversations with themselves.  

  I do not deny that individuals have privileged access to their
mental states.  After all, they are the only ones who can hear
their internal conversations.  I do, though, claim that the
provilege is not absolute.  It *is* possible, though very unusual,
to be wrong about what one believes.

	-- Bill

(Note:  There are other ways to analyze the concept of belief, but
I think the one I have given is closest to common usage.  If you
prefer a different analysis, please be explicit about it.  However
you analyze it, I will defend the claim that either i) belief is
trivial (i.e. if saying something means believing it); or ii) belief
does not occur in humans (i.e. if it requires infinite recursion);
or iii) it is possible to be wrong about what one believes.)


