From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!psych.toronto.edu!michael Mon Mar  9 18:35:27 EST 1992
Article 4285 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar)
Subject: Re: Monkey Room
Organization: Department of Psychology, University of Toronto
References: <68421@netnews.upenn.edu> <1992Mar4.210902.28435@psych.toronto.edu> <68723@netnews.upenn.edu>
Message-ID: <1992Mar5.201931.1980@psych.toronto.edu>
Date: Thu, 5 Mar 1992 20:19:31 GMT

In article <68723@netnews.upenn.edu> weemba@libra.wistar.upenn.edu (Matthew P Wiener) writes:
>In article <1992Mar4.210902.28435@psych.toronto.edu>, michael@psych (Michael Gemar) writes:
>>>>This thought-experiment seems to contradict several ideas-- the Turing
>>>>Test, behaviorism, functionalism, and the Systems Reply for starters.
>>>>Any comments?
>
>>>Yes.  It also contradicts reality.
>
>>>In other words, so what?
>
>>Well, it shows that the Turing Test is not infallible.
>
>Once you contradict reality, you can prove anything you want.  Yes, it's
>good to remind people that TT is not infallible.  But the Monkey Room does
>not prove it.

The example above is *not* physically impossible.  I will grant that it is
*highly* improbable.  But this is not at all the same thing.  Therefore, the
above case is a counterexample to the claim that the Turing Test will
*always* pick out intelligent behaviour.  (Remember, it was originally
called the "Imitation Game", after all.)

- michael




