From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!utgpu!pindor Mon Mar  9 18:35:03 EST 1992
Article 4247 of comp.ai.philosophy:
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
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>From: pindor@gpu.utcs.utoronto.ca (Andrzej Pindor)
Subject: Re: Beware of the vaporware salesmen
Message-ID: <1992Mar4.180621.24118@gpu.utcs.utoronto.ca>
Organization: UTCS Public Access
References: <1992Feb25.182526.12698@oracorp.com> <18595@castle.ed.ac.uk> <466@tdatirv.UUCP> <68339@netnews.upenn.edu>
Date: Wed, 4 Mar 1992 18:06:21 GMT

In article <68339@netnews.upenn.edu> weemba@libra.wistar.upenn.edu (Matthew P Wiener) writes:
>In article <466@tdatirv.UUCP>, sarima@tdatirv (Stanley Friesen) writes:
>>I think it remains true that what a brain does is to transform some input
>>data into some output data (including muscle control signals), and that,
>>since it only has access to an encoded representation of the data, this
>>transformation can only be syntactic.
>
>What is the internal representation of "self"?  "Privacy"?  "The natural
>numbers"?  I fail to see any obvious anything that these encode.
>
Does it prove that the above do not have some encoding? 

>>This statement is entirely consistant with what is curently known of
>>neurobiology.  It may not be the last word, but it is certainly not (yet)
>>disproven.  It is at least a reasonable point of view, given current
>>knowledge.
>
>That's about it.  There is no particular evidence for it, or against it.
>It's a reasonable point of view.  Not much more.
>
Given current knowledge! I.e. this view is based on evidence, even if it 
an extrapolation of such evidence.
Daryl McCullough in his last few postings very clearly stated realistic view on
how the concepts are formed in the brain (by realistic I mean based on what we
know about workings of the brain). Let me try my own rephrasing of it:
What happens in the brain (mind and its workings) is caused by general structure
of the wetware and a particular realisation of it (e.g. genetic differences)
as well as by signals the brain receives from the senses. The story of
Helen Keller, mentioned in other postings, underscores how crucial this sensory
input is. Both of the above aspects can in principle be reproduced by 
computers if we knew exact structure of the brain and the way it proceses 
external signals. Would you agree?
Now, if you see a third possibility, please say what it might be, together with
some evidence which might point to it. If you cannot, then we are left only
with one reasonable point of view, the one sketched above.

>>The only attempts I have seen to counter it are either inconclusive
>>appeals to intuition ("the brain has unexplained properties, so it must
>>have some mysterious mechanism to create them"), or appeals to the equally
>>mysterious, and inexplicable, philosophy of quantum mechanics (aka the
>>Copenhagen interpretation thereof).
>
>Vaporware appeals to imaginary computer processes are just as ludicrous.
>
No, because they are an extrapolation of existing evidence. The other attempts
are speculations with no grounding in experimental evidence. 

>>While I do admit that the brain has unexplained capabilities, I am perfectly
>>content to wait until they are explained to make any conclusions about what
>>sort of mechanisms are involved.  And in the mean time, I see no reason
>>to buy in to any one concept of them to the extent of deciding what
>>computers can and cannot do.
>
>Meanwhile, the burden of proof remains with those who peddle their amazing
>computer capabilities.
>
No, the burden of the proof remains with those who invent, out of thin air,
mysterious mechanisms for which there is no evidence.

>But it's fun to make bets now.

It is always good to have some fun.
>-- 
>-Matthew P Wiener (weemba@libra.wistar.upenn.edu)


-- 
Andrzej Pindor
University of Toronto
Computing Services
pindor@gpu.utcs.utoronto.ca


