From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!rpi!think.com!wupost!uunet!tdatirv!sarima Mon Mar  9 18:34:43 EST 1992
Article 4213 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: sarima@tdatirv.UUCP (Stanley Friesen)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Definition of understanding
Message-ID: <463@tdatirv.UUCP>
Date: 2 Mar 92 21:49:52 GMT
References: <450@tdatirv.UUCP> <1992Feb26.172245.10210@psych.toronto.edu> <456@tdatirv.UUCP> <1992Feb28.170150.14142@psych.toronto.edu>
Reply-To: sarima@tdatirv.UUCP (Stanley Friesen)
Organization: Teradata Corp., Irvine
Lines: 45

In article <1992Feb28.170150.14142@psych.toronto.edu> christo@psych.toronto.edu (Christopher Green) writes:
|In article <456@tdatirv.UUCP> sarima@tdatirv.UUCP (Stanley Friesen) writes:
|>
|>Semantics *is* distinct from syntax, but it is *not* obvious that it cannot
|>be *implemented* from a syntactic basis.  
|
|What is not obvious is that it can. And since yourself admit that they
|are patently different, the burden of proof is upon those who believe
|that such an implementation is possible. 

In a sense I agree, that is what the AI research program is all *about*,
coming up with that proof.  Again, mere assertion is not proof, so, for
now, the problem is *undecided*.   Until our level of knowledge of both
algorithms and natural neurological systms is *far* more complete than
it is now we simply *do* *not* *have* *the* *data* to answer this question.

The *only* way I know of to *get* the answer is to continue doing research,
the more, and the more various, the better.   My main objection to Searle
is his "you'll never get there, so why even try" attitude.  Even if he is
right the only way to demonstrate it conclusively os to learn far more than
we now know.

Thus, Searle's argument rests on unfounded assumptions, and is inconclusive
in and of itself. That is all I am saying.  I am *not* saying that semantics
actually *does* have a syntactic basis, only that it *may* have such and ruling
it out *a* *priori* (like Searle wants to do) is not a reasonable thing to do.

When the 'proof' one way or the other finally becomes available, we will all
know it.


However, in addition to the above, I have a fundamental problem with
Searle's ideas.  I cannot come up with any non-dualistic model that meets
his requirements.  That is I can see no way that mere electro-chemical
trancducers can add semantics to encoded information given that Searle's
assumptions are true.  And I do have an abhorrance for dualistic models.
[And since, I consider the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics
to be dualistic itself, calling in quantum effects does not really help].

Thus, for me personally, I find Searle's 'dualistic' claims to be the
fantastic idea and to require the more comprehensive evidence.
-- 
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uunet!tdatirv!sarima				(Stanley Friesen)



