From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!rutgers!usc!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!cis.ohio-state.edu!pacific.mps.ohio-state.edu!linac!unixhub!stanford.edu!CSD-NewsHost.Stanford.EDU!CSD-NewsHost!jmc Tue Nov 19 11:09:22 EST 1991
Article 1235 of comp.ai.philosophy:
Xref: newshub.ccs.yorku.ca sci.philosophy.tech:910 comp.ai.philosophy:1235
Path: newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!rutgers!usc!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!cis.ohio-state.edu!pacific.mps.ohio-state.edu!linac!unixhub!stanford.edu!CSD-NewsHost.Stanford.EDU!CSD-NewsHost!jmc
>From: jmc@SAIL.Stanford.EDU (John McCarthy)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech,comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Is there any such thing as informal logic?
Message-ID: <JMC.91Nov7214345@SAIL.Stanford.EDU>
Date: 8 Nov 91 05:43:45 GMT
References: <1991Oct22.041210.5931@watserv1.waterloo.edu>
	<JMC.91Nov5212441@SAIL.Stanford.EDU>
	<1991Nov6.122415.5160@husc3.harvard.edu>
Sender: news@CSD-NewsHost.Stanford.EDU
Reply-To: jmc@cs.Stanford.EDU
Organization: Computer Science Department, Stanford University
Lines: 19
In-Reply-To: zeleny@brauer.harvard.edu's message of 6 Nov 91 17:24:13 GMT

Much of Zeleny's post is obscure to me, but this much I understand
and disagree with

     ... the success of our reference to any entity, whether
     intensional or extensional, depends on our grasp of its
     concept, which in turn depends on our grasp on the concept
     of its concept, and so on.

Howwever, my disagreement may depend on an AI notion of success of
reference.  I would consider a robot to refer successfully to
chairs if it gets them when asked decides chairness of objects
in agreement with humans in those cases when the humans agree
with each other.  This doesn't require concepts of concepts,
although some other uses do.
--
"There's not a woman in his book, the plot hinges on unkindness to
animals, and the black characters mostly drown by chapter 29."

John McCarthy, Computer Science Department, Stanford, CA 94305


