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Article 1760 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: zeleny@zariski.harvard.edu (Mikhail Zeleny)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech,comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Searle
Message-ID: <1991Nov29.211333.5997@husc3.harvard.edu>
Date: 30 Nov 91 02:13:32 GMT
References: <1991Nov26.011950.1658@hilbert.cyprs.rain.com> <1991Nov26.105451.5918@husc3.harvard.edu> <RJC.91Nov29220207@brodie.cstr.ed.ac.uk>
Organization: Dept. of Math, Harvard Univ.
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Nntp-Posting-Host: zariski.harvard.edu

In article <RJC.91Nov29220207@brodie.cstr.ed.ac.uk> 
rjc@cstr.ed.ac.uk (Richard Caley) writes:

>In article <1991Nov26.105451.5918@husc3.harvard.edu>, 
>Mikhail Zeleny (mz) writes:

MZ:
>> It is precisely because, unlike you, I am not limited to the mechanistic
>> view of human mind, that I can give a successful account of abstract mental
>> structures.  You, on the other hand, in virtue of your claim of being able
>> to build a machine that represents its environment, appear to champion,
>> however unwittingly, reductive materialism. 

RC:
>Only if one accepts that there is an intrinsic difference between
>talking about people and talking about `machines', which is to concede
>the point before starting. Otherwise it is just as valid to apply the
>abstract non-mechanistic descriptions to the `machines' without any
>justification. Once does not need to _claim_ that these hypothetical
>semantic structures `arise spontaneously', just as one does not need
>to claim that they `arise spontaneously' in meat. One just talks as if
>they do and has as much justification as one does in talking that way
>about people. 

Fine.  Feel free to take up Vaihinger and his philosophy of "as if"; I'll
stick with explanatory rationalism and the principle of sufficient reason.
>From where I sit, I find myself to be at an advantage: there remains a
possibility that I would come up with a causal account of human connection
to abstract entities, whereas you commit yourself to an account by fiat.

RC:
>And I seriously doubt you can give a sucessful account of abstract
>mental structures. People have been trying for a number of centuries.

People have been trying to make homunculi for a number of centuries.
So what?

RC:
>Also, would you care to support you assertion that there _are_
>abstract mental structures? It sounds like you are at least as wedded
>to simple materialism as those you berate. To side step reductivist
>arguments by simply claiming that whatever high level `structures' you
>imagine you see in people really exist in and of themselves (for some
>unspecified meanining of `exists', of course) is a cop out. 

Church did a capital job in "The Need for Abstract Entities in Semantic
Analysis", reprinted in the Martinich anthology, "The Philosophy of
Language"; as I could never presume to improve on his account, I refer you
to it; in any case, "simple materialism" it sure ain't.

RC:
>To go back to Searle, one of the notable things about the Chinese Room
>is that it is seen as a solid argument by just about all and only
>those who accept the result before hand. It's not empty, it's
>circular. If one does not assume that there is something special about
>meat then the argument does not stand up. Why _should_ we expect to
>find `understanding' in Searle in the room rather than in the pencil
>or somewhere a million miles away, it is the preconception that
>understanding is a property of meat that makes it seem that the fact
>that Searle does not understand chinese provides a contradiction.
>Without that assumption the argument says nothing, with that
>assumption the argument proves the assumption. 

Nice assertion. Where's the argument?  

I make no claims about meat; I simply claim that I have understanding.

>--
>rjc@cstr.ed.ac.uk			_O_
>					 |<


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