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Article 1678 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: ken@dakota (Kenny Chaffin)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy,sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: On Denoting (was re: Arguments against Machine Intelligence)
Keywords: denotation, sense, communication
Message-ID: <1991Nov27.175341.15008@cherokee.uswest.com>
Date: 27 Nov 91 17:53:41 GMT
References: <43772@mimsy.umd.edu> <1991Nov27.111048.4933@odin.diku.dk> <1991Nov27.115032.5957@husc3.harvard.edu>
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In article <1991Nov27.115032.5957@husc3.harvard.edu> zeleny@zariski.harvard.edu (Mikhail Zeleny) writes:
>
>RK:
>Very well, I shall repeat my argument.  It is commonly assumed that
>computers are capable of symbol manipulation; an analogous claim is
>sometimes made on behalf of human brains, neural pulses being interpreted
>as the symbols in question.  However, in considering such claims, we must
>be careful about what we mean by `symbol'.  In philosophical use, this term
>is interpreted as a synonym of `sign' (cf. the use by Whitehead), sometimes
>used as standing for a conventional, substitutive sign (e.g.  by Peirce and
>Morris), or, alternatively, as an iconic, analogical sign (e.g. by Kant and
>Hegel).
	So there are lots of ways of using the word. What about the computer-
science use of symbol? Why must we use the philosophical definition?
>
>aliquo*.  The problem with identifying such a property is twofold.
	Why only twofold?
>
>If, on one hand, one identifies the neural pulses as purely denotative
>signs, ones that refer without expressing, one would be forced to postulate
>a causal relation in virtue of which these signs denote, stipulating that
>this causal relation is itself entirely immanent in nervous activity, in
>direct contradiction to the fact that our language, allegedly founded
>solely on such nervous activity, has no trouble referring to objects and
>phenomena that occur outside of the latter.

	Okay, nice long contorted sentence, but that's one hand.
>
>On the other hand, should one assume that neural pulses are connotative
>signs, which refer by virtue of expressing an intensional meaning, then
>such meanings, by the above observation, must be entirely captured in the
>physical states of the brain.

	And that's the other hand.
 Why must we choose. Why can't a brain
do both?

KAC


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Kenny A. Chaffin                      {...boulder}!uswat!ken
U S WEST Advanced Technologies         ken@dakota.uswest.com
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