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Article 1647 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Is semiotics an "informal logic"?
Message-ID: <5714@skye.ed.ac.uk>
Date: 26 Nov 91 20:27:53 GMT
References: <rreiner.689649195@yorku.ca> <BRe6aB2w164w@depsych.Gwinnett.COM> <1415@ariel.ucs.unimelb.edu.au> <1991Nov16.121439.5507@husc3.harvard.edu> <1454@ariel.ucs.unimelb.edu.au>
Reply-To: jeff@aiai.UUCP (Jeff Dalton)
Organization: AIAI, University of Edinburgh, Scotland
Lines: 10

In article <1454@ariel.ucs.unimelb.edu.au> jcollier@ariel.ucs.unimelb.edu.au (John Donald Collier) writes:
>The problem with most semantics is that they assume that we can
>determine reference from form alone. Perry and Barwise, through their
>use of causal structures, avoid this problem.

Are they trying to deal with that problem at all.  In the "Response
of Lakoff" in (I think) _The Situation in Logic_ (some title like
that), it's claimed that Lakoff (who argued that situation theory
couldn't solve that problem) had mistaken what they were trying to
do.


