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Article 1635 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech,comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Zeleny (was Re: Searle
Message-ID: <5706@skye.ed.ac.uk>
Date: 26 Nov 91 18:48:01 GMT
References: <1991Nov14.223348.4076@milton.u.washington.edu> <MATT.91Nov24000158@physics.berkeley.edu> <1991Nov24.195230.5843@husc3.harvard.edu> <1991Nov24.224724.2149@arizona.edu> <5691@skye.ed.ac.uk> <1991Nov25.184712.2156@arizona.edu>
Reply-To: jeff@aiai.UUCP (Jeff Dalton)
Distribution: world,local
Organization: AIAI, University of Edinburgh, Scotland
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In article <1991Nov25.184712.2156@arizona.edu> bill@NSMA.AriZonA.EdU (Bill Skaggs) writes:
>>Moreover, Searle does not assume any mystic powers.
>>He's more or less a materialist about mind.
>
>Okay, I spoke too quickly.  You are partly right -- Searle
>does not *assume* the stuff about "causal powers".  For
>Searle the mystic thing is "intentionality", which he
>seems to think of as being secreted by the brain in the
>same sense as the hypothalamus secretes hormones.

If intentionality is a mystic power, then we're often using mystic
powers and it may make sense to ask whether all that's needed is to
run the right program.

>The really curious thing about Searle is that he *is* a
>materialist.  He thinks of intentionality as a material
>thing.

Something caused by the brain, yes.

It sounds like you're saying: Searle thinks humans have some weird
property (intentionality) that one ordinarily wouldn't think humans
had, and the really curious thing is that Searle thinks that weird
property is materially caused.

But the weird property is just the ability of thoughts to be about
things in the world; and all materialists presumably think that has
a material basis.  So I don't think Searle is being particularly
strange here, or that those who think thoughts can be about things
would normally be accused of believing in mystic powers.

Another possibility, I suppose, is that you're not a materialist
and think Searle shouldn't be either.  But then you'd be the one
believing in mystic powers.

-- jd


