From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!rpi!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!sol.ctr.columbia.edu!emory!dscatl!gwinnett!depsych!rc Tue Nov 26 12:31:25 EST 1991
Article 1490 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: rc@depsych.Gwinnett.COM (Richard Carlson)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: semiotics and cognitive science
Message-ID: <e6JRBB3w164w@depsych.Gwinnett.COM>
Date: 21 Nov 91 13:18:25 GMT
References: <4219@anaxagoras.ils.nwu.edu>
Lines: 43

> I'm not sure what work John was referring to, but I see a need in much
> of current cognitive science for models that can infer mutual belief from
> limited evidence.  The work in analogical reasoning, for example, needs a
> better account of how the boundary of an analogy is determined (e.g. if I say
> "Bob is a pig", should you think I meant he has disgusting personal habits,
> or that he has a short curly tail?).  Theorists in that subfield readily
> acknowledge the frozen, conventional nature of metaphor, but don't seem at
> all interested in offering an account of how "frozenness" develops or is
> recognized.
> 
> The inferential power needed to do this *will* be great, but without it,
> what hope have we of doing speech acts any justice?  I have not read the
> Sperber and Wilson book, but I'm highly suspicious of any theory that claims
> to account for relevance or context without relying in some way on mutual
> belief.

I think the problem here is the question of what are the real
psychological _units_ we are dealing with and what _levels_ of
units do we have.  It's interesting that some people in the
"logical analysis" tradition go back to intentions as important
constructs in understanding utterances.  "Intentions" are the
basic building blocks (primitives?) of phenomenological philosophy
and of gestalt psychology (i.e., very "continental").  But then
the intention is expressed in an utterance (conceived here as a
"speech act") which itself is made up of units (of something).
Presumably the terms (words, tokens, signifiers, whatever) are the
units here.  My guess is that there is a "reciprocal" or
"dialectical" movement back and forth between the two levels with
the intention functioning as part of the context telling you
whether Bob is a slob or Bob will eat anything or Bob has a tail.
Here's the sticking point, though: because people in the logical
analysis tradition are preprogrammed ("set?") to see reciprocal
processes which move back and forth in small steps as "circular
reasoning" and believe implicitly that one process has to be the
"real" process while the other is merely epiphenomenal, they have
to argue that one of the levels, either the intentional or the
intensional/extensional is the key one.

--
Richard Carlson        |    rc@depsych.gwinnett.COM
Midtown Medical Center |    {rutgers,ogicse,gatech}!emory!gwinnett!depsych!rc
Atlanta, Georgia       |
(404) 881-6877         |


