From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.ecf!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!rpi!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!caen!spool.mu.edu!munnari.oz.au!bruce!monu0.cc.monash.edu.au!monu6!john@publications.ccc.monash.edu.au Tue Nov 26 12:30:43 EST 1991
Article 1418 of comp.ai.philosophy:
Xref: newshub.ccs.yorku.ca sci.philosophy.tech:1008 comp.ai.philosophy:1418
Path: newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.ecf!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!rpi!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!caen!spool.mu.edu!munnari.oz.au!bruce!monu0.cc.monash.edu.au!monu6!john@publications.ccc.monash.edu.au
>From: john@publications.ccc.monash.edu.au (John Wilkins)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech,comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Daniel Dennett (was Re: Commenting on the posting
Message-ID: <1991Nov18.224139.21896@monu6.cc.monash.edu.au>
Date: 18 Nov 91 22:41:39 GMT
Article-I.D.: monu6.1991Nov18.224139.21896
References: <9653@optima.cs.arizona.edu>
Sender: news@monu6.cc.monash.edu.au (Usenet system)
Organization: Monash University, Melbourne Australia
Lines: 99

In article <9653@optima.cs.arizona.edu>, gudeman@cs.arizona.edu (David Gudeman) writes:
> 
> ]This, of course, is exactly the same argument used by all those charlatans who
> ]denied that any reductive argument of living processes could be given.
> 
> I'd like to note that there are two issues here.  First, whether there
> is now, somewhere, some theory that successfully describes how
> self-awareness might arise out of physical processes, and second
> whether such a theory is even possible.  Mr. Zeleny seems to takes the
> strong view that such a thing is not possible, but any argument over
> that is going to boil down eventually to an argument over ontology,
> because the belief in a physical basis for self-awareness is in fact a
> deduction from philosophical materialism.  It is a philosophical
> belief, a faith if you will, not a scientific observation.
> 
> Some of the best philosophical arguments against materialism, are over
> just this issue --that there are good reasons to suppose that
> consciousness cannot be explained strictly through physical,
> "material" processes.  If someone did come up with a theoretical
> account of such processes, it would be a critical event in ontology.
> So I would like to see an honest response to Zeleny's challenge
> --either show us this world-shaking theory that explains how
> intelligence can arise from physical processes, or just admit that
> such a theory does not exist and may not be possible.

Such a theory does not exist, so why may it not be possible? That we
have not YET modelled or recreated consciousness (and we are a hell of
a lot closer now than we were in Descartes' day) in NO WAY implies that we
cannot, or that AI and neurophysiological research will never deliver it.
Still, it may not be possible - YOU show ME why it isn't, rather than all
this semantic crap about intentionality being irreducible. So much of
what used to be irreducible about mind has been reduced - language
learning, visual recognition, emotion - or is promising to be, that
a believer in Occam's Razor has every reason to be confident that the
obscurantism of occult properties such as "Consciousness" have no real
future.

> ][There's an amusing passage in Durkheim about how it is self-evident
> ]that life is not the properties of the chemical elements of life, since
> ]the molecules don't have living properties, used to justify the sui
> ]generis nature of social explanations, for example.]
> 
> So where is the joke?  If you are suggesting that biologists can now
> "explain life" as a purely physical process, you are mistaken.  There
> is still a great deal unknown.  (Although I understand that there are
> now demonstrations of spontaneous chemical differentation that were
> quite a coup for the reductionists).

When will there EVER be a great deal not unknown? There HAS been progress,
though. And biologists can "explain" a lot more about life as a physical
process than they can as a sui generis domain of non-physical (as opposed
to physical-neutral) phenomena.

> ]Again, an argument from ignorance. We reject theories because they fail
> ]for one reason or another, not a class of theories because we have
> ]"sound theoretical reasons".

> I'm sorry John, but _that_ is quite an ignorant statement.  Of course
> you can reject a whole class of theories for "sound theoretical
> reasons".  I feel quite confident rejecting any theory that purports
> to describe perpetual motion machines.  And I reject them for "sound
> theoretical reasons".  Now I _could_ be wrong, it may be the case that
> the first law of thermodynamics is a special case --say of systems
> that don't contain black candles and the severed hand of a hanged
> felon.  Quite frandly, I doubt that measurements have ever been done
> on such systems to verify the First Law, but I think you will agree
> that _theory_ is a sufficient reason to reject the premise that such a
> system can violate the first law until it is shown otherwise.

Whoa! Why do you want to reject a theory that violates thermodynamics?
Because you accept the theory of thermodynamics, of course. Does that give you
reason to reject a theory that violates, say, evolutionary laws of biology?
No, it is a different case. So you are not rejecting a class of theories
(the set of theories that violate established scientific canons) for "sound
theoretical reasons" of a global kind, but on an ad hoc basis - A' violates A;
B' violates B ... n' violates n. And you cannot appeal to methodological
reasons, since non have ever been shown to exist, apart from the rather vague
presumption we call Occam's Razor.
> 
> ]... *I* have sound theoretical reasons for
> ]rejecting all theories that claim to limit what is theoretically possible.
> ][I think...]
> 
> All theories limit what is theoretically possible, if they allowed
> everything, then they would have no content.  If what you mean is that
> you reject all theories that put limits on what can be "discovered"
> scientifically, then it seems to me that you have a rather
> questionable epistemology.  If all you mean is that you think
> everything is reducible to physics then you are really making an
> ontological claim.
> --

Sigh. It was a joke. No theoretical justification possible [df "joke"].

> 					David Gudeman
> gudeman@cs.arizona.edu
> noao!arizona!gudeman
> 
> 


