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Article 1372 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: jcollier@ariel.ucs.unimelb.edu.au (John Donald Collier)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Is semiotics an "informal logic"?
Message-ID: <1454@ariel.ucs.unimelb.edu.au>
Date: 18 Nov 91 10:19:06 GMT
References: <rreiner.689649195@yorku.ca> <BRe6aB2w164w@depsych.Gwinnett.COM> <1415@ariel.ucs.unimelb.edu.au> <1991Nov16.121439.5507@husc3.harvard.edu>
Organization: University of Melbourne
Lines: 82


  
In <1991Nov16.121439.5507@husc3.harvard.edu> zeleny@zariski.harvard.edu (Mikhail Zeleny) writes:

>In article <1415@ariel.ucs.unimelb.edu.au> 
>jcollier@ariel.ucs.unimelb.edu.au (John Donald Collier) writes:

}}In <BRe6aB2w164w@depsych.Gwinnet 
}rc@depsych.Gwinnett.COM (Richard Carlson) writes:

}RC:
}}}Is there such a thing as "formal semantics?"  Where would I find a
}}}text on this discipline?

}JDC:
}}One place to look would be _Formal Philosophy_ by Richard Montague.

}This is one of the worst places to start, as Montague's papers are
}well-unreadable even for an expert; moreover, the book is long out of
}print.


Well, It depends on what you mena by "expert", I suppose. Some of 
Stalnaker's writings are much more accessible, but they aren't collected
in a book that I know of.

}Try Dowty, Wall, and Peters' "Introduction to Montague Semantics", or
}Keenan and Faltz' "Boolean Semantics for Natural Languages", or, more
}elementary, Martin's "Elements of Formal Semantics".

Good suggestions, but there are hundreds of books that  deal with
formal semantics.

}JDC:
}}Another would be _Situations and Attitudes_ by Barwise and Perry.

}Situation theory has the dubious distinction of having been conclusively
}refuted by G\"odel and Church thirty years prior to its inception.  See the
}above authors utterly unsuccessful attempt to refute the refutation in
}Martinich's excellent anthology "The Philosophy of Language"; see also
}Church's, Tarski's, and Davidson's much better papers reprinted therein.
}Also avoid the transformational grammarians' attempts at semantical
}theorizing; above all, read Martin's book, and the recently translated
}Gamut, "Logic, Language, and Meaning".

I would question whether situation theory has been "conclusively
refuted". The problem with much of the formal approach to philosophy
(which Montague tried to remedy) is that it does not deal with real
problems. Perry and Barwise use causal structrues to connect to the
world. The problem with much of the nominalistic Platonism that has
infected much of Western philosophy is that it can be shown that its
content is zero.  The main problem is the assumption that any
distinction is one that we can make. Although my paper "How can I
conceive being a Brain in a Vat" deals mostly with Putnam, I mention
the role of this assumption in his argument. The paper is in the
December 1991 issue of the Australasion Journal of Philosophy.

The problem with most semantics is that they assume that we can
determine reference from form alone. Perry and Barwise, through their
use of causal structures, avoid this problem. The problem is that form
does not determine content. That can be determine donly by our
connections to the world. Basically, reference requires a certain
amount of luck.

In my opinion Putnam is wrong, but his mistake is not either his causal
theory of reference, or his observation (made by Newman back in the 30's)
that form does not determine reference, but in his assumption that semantic 
distinction depend on our capacities. 

Frankly, I would rather rely on real conections than the inventions
fo logicians, but perhaps this comes from my backgound in science.

Reference, on my view, is to what we would be connected to if we had
the proper connections. The connections are the contingent flows of
information, and concepts are, to use Dretske's term,
"digitalizations" of this flow. I do not see how formal structures can
connect us to the world.
 
-- 
John Collier 			Email: jcollier@ariel.ucs.unimelb.edu.au
HPS -- U. of Melbourne		  	Fax:   61+3 344 7959
Parkville, Victoria, AUSTRALIA 3052


