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Article 1371 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: gudeman@cs.arizona.edu (David Gudeman)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech,comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Daniel Dennett (was Re: Commenting on the posting
Message-ID: <9653@optima.cs.arizona.edu>
Date: 18 Nov 91 07:33:19 GMT
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In article  <1991Nov18.025504.11295@monu6.cc.monash.edu.au> John Wilkins writes:
]In article <1991Nov15.160741.5495@husc3.harvard.edu>, zeleny@walsh.harvard.edu (Mikhail Zeleny) writes:
]> ...  This conclusion might be justified historically, by observing
]> the earlier attempts to explain the functioning of human mind by reference
]> to the capabilities of the dominant contemporary technology...
]>  or its behaviorally manifested
]> properties -- by reference to observable physical properties of human
]> organs (remember phrenology?)...

]This, of course, is exactly the same argument used by all those charlatans who
]denied that any reductive argument of living processes could be given.

I'd like to note that there are two issues here.  First, whether there
is now, somewhere, some theory that successfully describes how
self-awareness might arise out of physical processes, and second
whether such a theory is even possible.  Mr. Zeleny seems to takes the
strong view that such a thing is not possible, but any argument over
that is going to boil down eventually to an argument over ontology,
because the belief in a physical basis for self-awareness is in fact a
deduction from philosophical materialism.  It is a philosophical
belief, a faith if you will, not a scientific observation.

Some of the best philosophical arguments against materialism, are over
just this issue --that there are good reasons to suppose that
consciousness cannot be explained strictly through physical,
"material" processes.  If someone did come up with a theoretical
account of such processes, it would be a critical event in ontology.
So I would like to see an honest response to Zeleny's challenge
--either show us this world-shaking theory that explains how
intelligence can arise from physical processes, or just admit that
such a theory does not exist and may not be possible.

][There's an amusing passage in Durkheim about how it is self-evident
]that life is not the properties of the chemical elements of life, since
]the molecules don't have living properties, used to justify the sui
]generis nature of social explanations, for example.]

So where is the joke?  If you are suggesting that biologists can now
"explain life" as a purely physical process, you are mistaken.  There
is still a great deal unknown.  (Although I understand that there are
now demonstrations of spontaneous chemical differentation that were
quite a coup for the reductionists).

]Again, an argument from ignorance. We reject theories because they fail
]for one reason or another, not a class of theories because we have
]"sound theoretical reasons".

I'm sorry John, but _that_ is quite an ignorant statement.  Of course
you can reject a whole class of theories for "sound theoretical
reasons".  I feel quite confident rejecting any theory that purports
to describe perpetual motion machines.  And I reject them for "sound
theoretical reasons".  Now I _could_ be wrong, it may be the case that
the first law of thermodynamics is a special case --say of systems
that don't contain black candles and the severed hand of a hanged
felon.  Quite frandly, I doubt that measurements have ever been done
on such systems to verify the First Law, but I think you will agree
that _theory_ is a sufficient reason to reject the premise that such a
system can violate the first law until it is shown otherwise.

]... *I* have sound theoretical reasons for
]rejecting all theories that claim to limit what is theoretically possible.
][I think...]

All theories limit what is theoretically possible, if they allowed
everything, then they would have no content.  If what you mean is that
you reject all theories that put limits on what can be "discovered"
scientifically, then it seems to me that you have a rather
questionable epistemology.  If all you mean is that you think
everything is reducible to physics then you are really making an
ontological claim.
--
					David Gudeman
gudeman@cs.arizona.edu
noao!arizona!gudeman


