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From: stevens@prodigal.psych.rochester.edu (Greg Stevens)
Subject: Re: Thought Question
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In <1995Jan20.024336.19682@walter.cray.com> mwd@cray.com (Mark Dalton) writes:
>Greg Stevens (stevens@prodigal.psych.rochester.edu) wrote:
>:<1995Jan17.174819.14582@walter.cray.com> mwd@cray.com (Mark Dalton) writes:

>:>	If you look at a flies nerve system it is quite complex, and they
>:>have a brain. But are they self-aware or do they just function on mechanical
>:>decisions, or chemotaxis?

>: Self-awareness is one thing, but I will side-step it with applying the same 
>: question about flies to consciousness.  If you like, wee can discuss whether
>: self-awareness is requisit for consciousness, which I think it is not. 

> [dictionary definition of consciousness deleted]

You provide a dictionary definition of consciousness.  While I don't think
dictionary definitions are all that useful in philosophical discussion or
any kind of debate, we can go that route if you like.  In Webster's third
new international dictionary there are several definitions which seem to
correspond to "intuitive" definitions of consciousness, plus some 
colloquial usages.  Among these definitions, the most relevant (i.e. non
slang or colloquial) seem to be:
  1) awareness or perception of an inward psychological or spiritual fact;
  2) inward awareness of an external fact, state or object;
  3) the state or activity characterizes by sensation, emotion or thought;
  4) the totality of perceptions, ideas, attitudes and feelings.
     (definitions renumbered for convenience in this discussion)

Each of these can be moreidifed according to definitions of individual words
within that definition for clarity.  The word awareness, appearing in
two of the definitions, can be defined more explicitly, and the last two
(consisting of lists) can be reduced to a list of properties which a
conscious entity must have.  This process of substitution and integration
of lists yields the following definitions:
  1) realization, perception or knowledge of an inward psychological or
     spiritual fact;
  2) inward realization, perception, or knowlege of an external fact,
     state or object;
  3) having the characteristics of sensation, perception, emotion, thought,
     ideas, attitudes and feelings. 
 
Further, since ideas are the elements of thought, feelings the elements of
emotion, and attitudes are simply feelings ABOUT things, the third list can
be shortened further:

  3) having the characteristics of: sensation, perception, emotion and 
     thought.

these definitions seem to be a list of similar, yet distinct, and irriducible
concepts people label as characteristics of "consciousness."  

  In number 2) "inward realization, perception or knowledge" (translated from
"inward awareness") can be interpreted in two possible ways:
  i) "inward awareness" could be construed as redundant, because awareness
     of external things must be inward because "awareness" necessarily
     refers to our internal states.  In this case, this could be dropped
     and "knowledge" could simply be added to the list (realization derives
     back to either perception, thought, or knowledge, depending on the
     definition used)
 ii) by "inward" it could be meant that we sense the act of realization
     perception or knowledge within us as we apply it to the external
     object.  Thus, this definition could be reduced to "being aware of
     being aware of external objects," or merely "self-awareness," which
     could be added to the list of definition 3.
Finally, 1) could be considered redundant under interpretation i) of
"inward" or construed as self-awareness under interpretation ii) or "inward"
yeilding the following list of inclusion criteria for "consciousness":

     sensation, perception, emotion, thought, (possibly "self-awareness)

Because of the ambiguity of "inward awareness" the necessity of including
self-awareness is unsure.  Further, there is much debate about whether
emotion is necessarily a part of consciousness.  Finally, the criteria
for "thought" comes into question, because the inclusion criteria are
different for 1st person and 3rd person consideration.  In the first
person, we have an introspective notion of thoughts and their properties
(i.e. being propositional, etc).  However, in the third person, we
ascribe thought and knowledge to effective behavior in an environment
(this view is defended by Maturana and Varela, and is exemplified in
Gregory Bateson's claim that certain trees "know how" to fight off
forest fires).

  Which bring us to the final point: that the only way of characterizing
consciousness in the FIRST person is THROUGH self-awareness -- this,
however, does not imply that self-awareness is requisit for consciousness
(for example, if one took a 3rd person characterization, like the Turing
Test is an attempt to be).  Saying that because we can only introspect
consciousness when there is self-awareness, and therefore all consciousness
must have self-awareness, is as fallacious as concluding that all crows
have been observed from the fact that "all crows that I have observed
have been observed."


>I would say 'knows', chemotaxis or phototaxis are not 'knowing' any more
>than a photosensor 'knowing' that there is light or a chemical 'knowing'
>that its catalyst is there so it 'decides' to react.

Are decisions requisit for knowing?  As I referred to above, there are
those who defing knowlege as effective behavior in an environment.  This
is a good 3rd person definition of knowledge.   We say that a person "knows"
the course material when the person does the appropriate behaviors (answers
correctly) in a certain environment (on the test).  Otherwise, not.  We say
a child knows not to touch a hot stove when it ceases to touch the hot stove.
We say the cat knows it is dinner time when at the time appropriate for
feeding it comes meowing to the door.

When you put an amoeba in a petri dish with a glucose source, it goes twards
it and engulfs it.  Do you have any behavioral reason for thinking that it 
does not "know" that the glucose is something it should eat?

And if you argue that it has no knowledge, and come to that conclusion based
on your knowledge of its physiological structure, doe that mean that if
we eventually understand enough about the brain, we will suddenly have no
knowledge any more whatsoever?

>Knowledge really speaks of a awareness of the meaning
>a understanding of the information and not a mere reaction to it.

How do we measure awareness of meaning and understanding?  What constitutes
meaning and understanding?  When the amoeba reacts appropriately, it diplays
very clearly that it understands the meaning of glucose TO AMOEBAS.  It has
understanding of what glucose is FOR AMOEBAS.

Greg Stevens

stevens@prodigal.psych.rochester.edu

