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From: markrose@spss.com (Mark Rosenfelder)
Subject: Re: Chaos and Computation
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References: <3okkj7$s7d@cc.joensuu.fi> <801256111snz@longley.demon.co.uk> <3ptlio$r3m@mp.cs.niu.edu> <801269896snz@longley.demon.co.uk>
Date: Tue, 30 May 1995 22:59:55 GMT
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In article <801269896snz@longley.demon.co.uk>,
David Longley  <David@longley.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>As I see it, Popper basically made the point that the information content of 
>a hypothesis increases as it inceases in the number of conjunctive clauses, 
>and that falsification of any one of those clauses falsifies the lot. 
>
>Furthermore, as the conjunctives grow, ie become more specific, e.g, 'it will 
>rain on sunday, and at 3pm, and for 5 minutes', they becomes less likely. 

And at the same time it becomes more uncertain what a falsification falsifies.

>But is philosophy of science normative or descriptive?

Shouldn't philosophy of science find out what science does first before
telling it what it *should* do?  

Feyerabend makes a good case, I think, that if Galileo's peers had applied
strict Popperian rules, they would have had to reject the heliocentric
theory, which was falsified by the best evidence of the time.
