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From: shil0124@sable.ox.ac.uk ("Peter J. King")
Subject: Re: Is I is or is I not or both or neither 
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Date: Mon, 1 May 1995 18:29:37 +0100
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On 27 Apr 1995, John Hoban wrote:

> Robert Heinlein, a well respected sci-fi author (Stranger in a strange
> land and lots of others) often wrote scenarios (particularly "The moon
> is a harsh mistriss") where a computer becomes so large, so advanced,
> so complex, that a "consciousness" emerges, and a person-ality.

	I've always found this an intriguing idea, but as I remember he 
adds that the way that the computer is treated is also important; you 
don't get a person unless you treat the computer as a person.

> I know many will poo-poo this without any further adu, I sure don't
> like to think of myself as a computer, or bio-computer. But silicon based
> or carbon based, is that a big difference? So no wonder the desperate
> will to be more than body? of course, maybe I should say, WONDER the
> will to be more than just a body, for I think the very desire to be more
> is proof enough that we are more. Otherwise, why such a silly notion?
> Why such an abstract desire? I think it's longing for what we really are,
> besideS the body we are as well. 
> 
> Serious question to all:  Is this what is ment when I see the term 
> "dualistic" in these postings?  Elaborations appreciated.

	Well, `dualism' is a term that covers a wide range of positions. 
I think that Heinlein's idea is *substance* dualism, positing the
existence of two separate sorts of thing.  A *property* dualist thinks 
that there's only one thing, but two sorts of description of it, neither 
being more fundamental, neither being reducible to the other.

	An important point to note about dualism is that it's a 
metaphysical thesis, and one that no empirical findings can disprove.  
Those who argue for physicalist views of various kinds start by assuming 
that there's no separate mental realm, and go on to try to show that we 
can explain mental phenomena.  Even if we could (as we can't) explain the 
mental in terms of the physical, dualism might still be true.

	Physicalism's main hurdle is its third-person point of view; 
consciousness is a first-person phenomenon.  It's good to see that the
sheeplike urge of philosophers, for some time leading off towards broadly
physicalist theories, has recently begun to lead them off in more
promising directions. 


* * *

>                                    Where New Yorkers come to ski,
> after driving 90 minuets in ski boots, dressed in leopard tights 
                   ^^^^^^^
> and white furry leg-warmers.

	What a marvellous image...

========================================================
Peter J. King, St Hilda's College, Oxford  OX4 1DY, U.K.
========================================================

