Newsgroups: comp.ai.alife,comp.ai.philosophy,comp.ai,alt.consciousness
Path: cantaloupe.srv.cs.cmu.edu!rochester!udel!gatech!swrinde!pipex!uknet!festival!edcogsci!jeff
From: jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton)
Subject: Re: Thought Question
Message-ID: <D4voMp.9E@cogsci.ed.ac.uk>
Sender: usenet@cogsci.ed.ac.uk (C News Software)
Nntp-Posting-Host: bute.aiai.ed.ac.uk
Organization: AIAI, University of Edinburgh, Scotland
References: <jqbD4roBv.9Dv@netcom.com> <D4ttMz.I4x@cogsci.ed.ac.uk> <3j5ftj$8j7@mp.cs.niu.edu>
Date: Fri, 3 Mar 1995 18:56:48 GMT
Lines: 94
Xref: glinda.oz.cs.cmu.edu comp.ai.alife:2658 comp.ai.philosophy:25843 comp.ai:27906

In article <3j5ftj$8j7@mp.cs.niu.edu> rickert@cs.niu.edu (Neil Rickert) writes:
>In <D4ttMz.I4x@cogsci.ed.ac.uk> jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) writes:
>>In article <jqbD4roBv.9Dv@netcom.com> jqb@netcom.com (Jim Balter) writes:
>
>>>When I ask you to explain the meanings of your terms, you refuse
>>>with this nonsense about demanding definitions.  I have tired of
>>>such disingenuousness.
>
>>I find that there's plenty of interesting discussion in CogSci
>>and in philosophy of mind that doesn't get hung up on definitions,
>>...
>
>>I'll leave you with the following quotes from that excellent book
>>_Consciousness in Contemporary Science_:
>
>>  `Qualia' is an unfamiliar term for something that could not be
>>  more familiar to each of us: the _way things seem to us_.  As is
>>  often the case with philosophical terms, it is often easier to
>>  give examples than to give a definition of the term.  [Dennett]
>
>This is all very well.  And indeed one can often get by without
>definitions.  But when there is no definition of terms, there
>is no certainty of agreement and arguments are normally not
>conclusive.

I don't think there's certainty of agreement in any case.  Nor
will definitions ensure that arguments will be conclusive.  Indeed,
I don't think we're yet in a position to have conclusive arguments
on questions of machine understanding and the like.  Precise
definitions of consciousness, understanding, etc, are among the
things we have to develop.

Moreover, while definitions may sometimes be necessary, which I take
to be your position, a lack of precise definitions is not always
the most significant obstacle.

>For example -- if you claim that Searle's CR is a persuasive argument
>that strong AI will not produce understanding, that is a reasonable
>claim to make for an undefined term.  If, on the other hand, you were
>to claim that the CR argument is a decisive proof of the
>impossibility of strong AI, it would be entirely appropriate to
>demand a definition of "understanding".

I agree.  But my position on such issues is basically what the
Alt.Atheism FAQ calls "empirical agnosticism" ("those that do not
believe that the question is intrinsically unknowable, but instead
believe that the evidence for or against God is inconclusive, and
therefore are undecided about the issue" -- but with "God", of course,
replaced).

>Or, to use Dennett's example, if you don't define "qualia", but
>introduce it by example, that might be sufficient.  But if you then
>were to claim that qualia didn't exist, it would be proper to demand
>a definition which would make it clear as to what it is that does not
>exist.

Just so, and Dennett does give a more precise account of what he's
"quining" later in the paper ("Quining Qualia").  He introduces
various properties that qualia are supposed (by philosophers) to
have, and argues that nothing with all those properties exists.
But Dennett seems to think that takes care of qualia full stop,
even though qualia as "the way things seem to us" might be 
accounted for in another way, and even though it's not clear that
anyone holds that qualia have all the properties Dennett lists.
(For a reasonable reply to Dennett along those lines, see Owen
Flanagan's _Consciousness Reconsidered_.)

>The point, in other words, it that you can get by without definitions
>provided your claims are not too strong.  The stronger your claims,
>the greater your obligation to be precise about what those claims
>amount to.

I agree.  But sometimes a discussion reaches a point where A is
saying that B needs to define his terms and where it's not possible
to provide a definition that will satisfy A.  For instance, if A
wants a definition of "consciousness" that provides an empirical
test of weather something's conscious, and what B has in mind by
"consciousness" is along the lines of having subjective experience
or being an entity that it's "like something" to be, then (at least
at present) B can't provide a definition that will satisfy A.

In such cases, there isn't much more that can usefully be said.  
A and B can get into a loop in which B provides definitions and A
finds fault with them (what I call "the definition game"); or A 
can accuse B of talking vacuous nonsense (as often happens in
sci.skeptic); or they can try out various other accusations, e.g. 
of question begging; or they can go their separate ways.

I feel that, for whatever reason, I have reached a point rather like
that with Jim Balter.  When I've tried to explain meanings, it hasn't
made any difference, and I'm not interested in playing the definition
game.  

-- jd
