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From: kovsky@netcom.com (Bob Kovsky)
Subject: Re: Is CONSCIOUSNESS continuous? discrete? quantized?
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Date: Thu, 23 Feb 1995 20:17:11 GMT
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In a previous article Greg Stevens 
quoted me and rejoined:

>>There are no such machines.
>
>But such machines could in principle exist.  Humans have finite capacity to
>distinguish sensory input along a finite number of sensory input channels
>(sensory neurons) and thus has a finite number of possible inputs at any
>given time; humans have finite precision with motor activity along a
>inite number of motor output channels (motor neurons) and thus have a finite
>number of possible outputs; humans live a finite amoutn of time and there
>fore have a finite number of internal states.
>
>Conclusion: with finite inputs, outputs and states, any human could be
>THEORETICALLY modelled on a Turing-equivalent machine.

Your argument:  if human experience is a Turing-equivalent machine with 
finite inputs, outputs and states, then it can be modelled on a 
Turing-equivalent machine.

What if your model doesn't apply?  Acknowledged leaders in neuroscience, 
such as G. M. Edelman and W. F. Freeman, conclude that your model doesn't 
apply.  Most scientific models have a finite lifetime, after all.

-- 

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    Bob Kovsky          |  A Natural Science of Freedom 
    kovsky@netcom.com   |  Materials available by anonymous ftp
                        |  At ftp.netcom.com/pub/fr/freedom
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