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From: markrose@spss.com (Mark Rosenfelder)
Subject: Re: When is a simulation of a Y a Y? (Was Bag the Turing
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References: <D2D0sM.55o@spss.com> <D2pzFL.L38@cogsci.ed.ac.uk> <D2xL96.AMB@spss.com> <D2z6xA.B2H@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca>
Date: Thu, 26 Jan 1995 18:58:26 GMT
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In article <D2z6xA.B2H@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca>,
Andrzej Pindor <pindor@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca> wrote:
>It seems to me that we runnining into an interpretation of "filling-in".
>Perhaps I have not read enough books or papers where this term is used (just
>Dennet's CE). If most of those who use this term mean some sort of Cartesian
>Theater (filling-in as creating a complete picture for some conscious 
>'observer') then I'd agree with Dennet's critique. However, on the face of it, 
>'filling-in' means for me creating in the brain more or less complete (no 
>holes or empty regions) model of the surrounding space, which is available to 
>any brain process which might need it as an input. Say I am moving backwards in 
>a gym - there is some process in my brain which keeps of account where I am. It 
>must use such a model and monitor my position within this model, since at 
>a certain moment I might stop (an interrupt from the monitoring process 
>arrived) becoming aware that I may be close to the wall. When I look behind me 
>I may sometimes find that I might have made another step back, but important 
>thing is that a warning sounded on a basis of a model which includes parts 
>not currently available to the senses.

I think we're dealing with different meanings of "filling in".  The citations
Dennett gives, referred to in my discussion with Jeff, were in the context
of the blind spot; he also discusses such ideas as that the brain "fills in"
the visual field to the level of resolution of the fovea, or that it "fills
in" the red grid on the back cover of the book with pink in between the lines.

The example you give doesn't involve any of these questionable processes, 
but involves building some representation of our surroundings; as you point
out (by noting that the model may be off a step or two), these representations
have less detail of the original sense data.  I don't have any problem 
with that, and I don't see that Dennett does either.
