Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
From: Lupton@luptonpj.demon.co.uk (Peter Lupton)
Path: cantaloupe.srv.cs.cmu.edu!nntp.club.cc.cmu.edu!hudson.lm.com!news.pop.psu.edu!news.cac.psu.edu!howland.reston.ans.net!news.sprintlink.net!demon!luptonpj.demon.co.uk!Lupton
Subject: Re: When is a simulation of a Y a Y? (Was Bag the Turing
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Date: Sat, 7 Jan 1995 22:26:19 +0000
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Aaron Sloman asked when is a simulation of a Y a Y.

One thing which tends to interfere with this property
is indexicality, which can show up in all sorts of ways.
Presumably we gain access to indexicality through the
fact that our senses are embedded in the world in specific
ways. Given this, we can use words such as *this* and 
*that* as part of our concept of what a Y is.

So, for example, Champagne is wine made from that region 
of France. And France could be the country accessed in these 
ways (for me, by channel tunnel, say). A simulation of France
would not, on that account, be France - I don't access a
simulation of France through the channel tunnel. Perhaps
I do it through a computer head-set or some such. 

One way of reading Searle is that he takes indexicality
to apply to the mind - minds are built out of underlying 
causal structures in *this* way (and not the simulation way).

One way of reading Hans Moravec is that, perhaps, Hans
is very little impressed by indexicality so that even 
notions such as *this continuity*, *this discreteness*,
*this compactness* is not considered to be particularly 
relevant.

Cheers,
Pete Lupton
