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From: jqb@netcom.com (Jim Balter)
Subject: Re: CR denies computer addition? (was Re: Penrose and Searle)
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References: <Czu5zD.Dto@festival.ed.ac.uk> <Czzosp.Br5@cogsci.ed.ac.uk> <D062F0.FCK@festival.ed.ac.uk> <D0EGs0.167@cogsci.ed.ac.uk>
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Date: Tue, 6 Dec 1994 21:46:45 GMT
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In article <D0EGs0.167@cogsci.ed.ac.uk>,
Jeff Dalton <jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk> wrote:
>>>Bull.
>
>Chris, you're distorting my point by leaving out the part of your
>article that did the most to get me to say "Bull".

Oh, now Chris is the distorter.  He distorted "Bull".  Any honest observer
would have easily understood the full and deep implications of Jeff's cogent
argument, and never would have removed the context that gave it its rich
meaning.

Bull.

>I think subjective perception of number is a red herring, BTW.
>So is "subjective feel of understanding".  Set aside the TT debate,
>source of so much distortion.

Well, yes some parties to the debate do a lot of distorting.  (Certainly if by
TT you mean the exact test proposed by Turing, rather than the general concept
of examining understanding and intelligence through strictly textual exchange;
the latter is usually what is at issue ("a TT of sorts", as Andrzej puts it.))
But I don't think we really can set it aside, and in fact you reintroduce it
two sentences later.

>Imagine something that miserably
>fails to exhibit a behavioral understanding of what "dog" means.
>Indeed, if you ask them they say "Yeah, you've got me.  It's
         ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

I.e., if you play the TT with them.

Suppose that we play an elaborate TT game with someone, and they *do*
claim to know what "dog" means, describe dogs, talk about how to react to
dogs, provide an accurate report of someone "exhibit[ing] a behavioral
understanding of what `dog' means".  Is this not itself a "behavioral
understanding"?  Now suppose we examine this person's actual physical
response to dogs, and finds that s/he doesn't recognize them or responds
inappropriately to them.  Should we say, therefore, that s/he doesn't
understand what "dog" means?  I would be inclined to try to figure out
where the disconnect occurred between the mental understanding and the physical
behavior.  Perhaps the person has a perceptual malfunction, or has some
sort of dog-related psychosis.  But the textual exchange makes me pretty sure
that s/he does in fact understand what "dog" means.

Non-linguistic behavior can be used to judge someone's understanding.
That in no way negates the value of using textual exchange to do so also.
And the latter eliminates more factors that, while interesting themselves,
do not relate immediately to what we mean by "understanding".

>just a meaningless symbol to me, but I've picked up some of the
>ways it's used in English and I thought I could get by."  Is
>what this guy lacks the "subjective feel of understanding"?

You are replacing a situation with its converse.  The question isn't whether
someone who *does not* have a "behavioral understanding" of "dog" lacks
a "subjective fell of understanding"; there is no debate of such an issue.
The question is whether someone who *does* show a "behavioral understanding"
of "dog" necessarily also has a "subjective feel of understanding", and whether
that is important.  The debate goes on because people such as Searle
and dualists raise it, and because it challenges our understanding of terms
like "understand".  If you think it is an unimportant debate, then don't
debate it.  But it is, after all, the subject of Chris's thread.
-- 
<J Q B>
