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From: kovsky@netcom.com (Robert Kovsky)
Subject: Re: What is Free Will?  Clarifying the problem. 
Message-ID: <kovskyCx5xr9.JH@netcom.com>
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Date: Tue, 4 Oct 1994 19:21:09 GMT
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On 23 Sep 1994, Melissa L Book wrote:

> The question is -- are we truly able to choose what we want, or must
> we follow some pre-determined course for our lives (without being
> aware of it)?

"Free will" is unnecessarily complex because it sticks together two 
problems:  freedom and power (or will).  "Freedom" is simpler, although 
still not easy.

When you perform a task that requires spontaneous and purposeful action, 
you exercise freedom.  Examples are:  writing a description of a visual 
image; unpacking and arranging your belongings in a new home or office; 
designing and writing a computer program.  "Spontaneous" because it must 
be done "as it happens":  no pre-arranged mechanical method will 
suffice.  "Purposeful" because the action is carried out to achieve some 
end and without the end the task cannot be understood.  "Spontaneous" 
means that "mechanism" cannot account for the action; "purposeful" means 
that "probability" cannot account for the action.  Hence, models (such as 
those adapted from physics) that rely entirely on mechanism and 
probability cannot account for the action.

More at the ftp site designated below.

-- 

*   *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *   * 
    Bob Kovsky          |  A Natural Science of Freedom 
    kovsky@netcom.com   |  Materials available by anonymous ftp
                        |  At ftp.netcom.com/pub/freeedom
*   *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *   * 
