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Article 6963 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: markrose@spss.com (Mark Rosenfelder)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: what is consciousness for?
Message-ID: <1992Sep17.225421.7665@spss.com>
Date: 17 Sep 92 22:54:21 GMT
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In article <iordonez.716751021@academ01> iordonez@academ01.mty.itesm.mx 
(Ivan Ordonez-Reinoso) writes:
>I completely agree with this point. The code in a program has no
>semantic meaning to the hardware, since the hardware is unable to
>understand anything (it only _DOES_ things). But Minsky seems to relate
>consciousness with knowing, and knowing with 'knowledge' in the sense of
>containing information. From a purely functional point of view, a
>computer that simulates itself 'knows' itself and is self-aware. In this
>sense it seems obvious to me that self awareness is not a sufficient
>condition to consciousness.

Does Minsky accept that self-simulation = self-knowledge?  If not, your
conclusion about his definition doesn't follow.

>>>I don't think consciousness can be defined in terms of observing,
>>>noticing, knowing. Minsky's definition is, in my opinion, specifically
>>>cooked to make appear that machines are better than us in this regard.
>>>This is like a painter who uses a lot of green in his pictures defining
>>>beauty as the amount of green a picture has!
>
> [MR:]
>>And the fact that we would reject the painter's definition shows that we
>>do have a notion of beauty that goes beyond mere greenness.  If it were 
>>true that we "don't have the least idea" what consciousness is, as you 
>>assert above, then there would be no way to criticize Minsky's definition 
>>(or anyone else's).
>
>I think we have a notion of beauty, but I couldn't say what it is. I
>would even dare to say nobody has the least idea of what beauty is,
>since nobody has ever formalized the concept yet. 

If you don't have a formalized concept of something, that doesn't mean you
don't have the least idea of it-- it means you don't have a full knowledge
of it!

>Or do you have a
>computer program that can read any input (a symphony, the picture of a
>flower, a book from Kafka, a theorem, a sunset) and find its degree of
>beauty? 

Again, this is no criteria for having "the least knowledge" of something.

Of course, the computer program is absurd for another reason-- beauty is not  
an absolute property of objects, but a cultural and individual judgment.
That we can't provide an objective definition of beauty says nothing about
whether we can do so for consciousness.

>However, we can, at least, recognize what is _not beauty_. I am
>almost certain that the amount of green in a picture is not beauty. 

Suppose I said that beauty was some linear combination of sensory pleasure,
artistic skill, and evoked emotional response.  You might not quite agree,
but surely you'd admit this is much more on the right track than the
amount-of-green definition.  The fact that you can criticize definitions of 
beauty show that you do have useful notions of what it is.

Likewise we have intuitions of what is or isn't a part of consciousness;
it's not that we know nothing about it, only that our knowledge is vague
and descriptive rather than analytical and predictive.  

>>One need not be a materialist to assume that consciousness has a purpose.
>>In most theistic systems, our consciousness presumably serves some purpose
>>of the gods.  In what systems does consciousness serve no purpose at all?
>
>Theism is not the only alternative to materialism. 

No one says it is.  Your claim was that "asserting that consciousness must
have a specific purpose implies taking for granted a certain materialistic
point of view"; I was simply pointing out that this conclusion doesn't follow.

>My claim is that it
>is erroneous to speak about consciousness as if it were just another
>organ in our bodies, or another function of an organ, like 'vision' or
>hearing. I am sorry to repeat myself, but I must say again that while
>all those functions (like vision) relate with doing things,
>consciousness relates with being. Of course this is philosophical and
>metaphysical, but this is a philosophy newsgroup, after all.

Even in philosophy one should be able to back up one's claims, n'est-ce pas?
How about explaining how you know that that it's "erroneous" to speak of
the function of consciousness?  Or why I should accept your notions of "being"?


