From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!torn!cs.utexas.edu!uwm.edu!ogicse!qiclab!nosun!hilbert!max Mon Nov  9 09:36:13 EST 1992
Article 7458 of comp.ai.philosophy:
Path: newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!torn!cs.utexas.edu!uwm.edu!ogicse!qiclab!nosun!hilbert!max
>From: max@hilbert.cyprs.rain.com (Max Webb)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Your victory is your defeat
Message-ID: <1992Oct31.013730.27375@hilbert.cyprs.rain.com>
Date: 31 Oct 92 01:37:30 GMT
Article-I.D.: hilbert.1992Oct31.013730.27375
References: <1992Oct28.221356.9095@meteor.wisc.edu>
Organization: Cypress Semiconductor Northwest, Beaverton Oregon
Lines: 44

In article <1992Oct28.221356.9095@meteor.wisc.edu> tobis@meteor.wisc.edu (Michael Tobis) writes:

[A whole bunch of quotes on the difference between subjective and objective,
constituting an appeal to authority...].

Question: for you, Mr. Tobis:
Does this argument fairly represent your view on the irreducibility of
experience to objective fact?

1) A physiologist grows up in an immunoprotective plastic bubble.
Only blue light shines in this bubble, and she never sees red in her
life.

2) However, this physiologist has studied color perception, and
knows _EVERYTHING_ about the physical process (including neurology,
optics, the whole shebang) of color perception.

3) She doesn't know what red is like (when viewing it). Therefore,
red perception cannot be entirely a physical process.

Is this as representative of your line of argument, as I think it is?


The fallacy in the above argument is that the verb 'know' is used
in one sense in (2) (theoretical understanding), in another sense in
(3) (sensory familiarity); the two definitions are conflated, resulting
in a fallacy of equivation.

Whether or not that argument was a good summary, the following is true:

No amount of knowledge about an experience, provides
you with that experience. But why should we expect it to? Suppose
God gave us a magic lens with which to view these amazing souls you
tell us about. This lens is of such power that it can discern the
internal structure of a soul, and show us how it works. When I use
the lens to view someone experiencing redness, will I then percieve
redness? I don't think so.

Your invocation of immaterial boojums hasn't bridged the barrier
between objective and subjective - it has just pushed the question
up where you are less likely to ask it. Not progress, as far as I
can see.

	Max G. Webb


