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Article 7454 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: markrose@spss.com (Mark Rosenfelder)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: grounding and the entity/environment boundary
Message-ID: <1992Oct30.195251.9573@spss.com>
Date: 30 Oct 92 19:52:51 GMT
References: <720241604@sheol.UUCP> <markrose.720385670@spssig> <1992Oct30.143242.8130@news.media.mit.edu>
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In article <1992Oct30.143242.8130@news.media.mit.edu> minsky@media.mit.edu 
(Marvin Minsky) writes:
>Etc.  Lots of good stuff here.  But it is all about memory, not
>"grounding" -- whatever that is.  Is it the same as "semantics"?

I tend to equate grounding with the folk notion of "knowing what you're 
talking about."  If I talk about something I haven't directly experienced,
like marijuana, I could be accused of "not knowing what I'm talking about"; 
in this case my statements could be meaningful, but ungrounded.

I assume grounding is most important to those (like Harnad and George Lakoff) 
who see meaning as derived from direct real-world experience.  I suppose it 
wouldn't much interest those who identify "meaning" merely with logical sense 
or reference, or with the magic of causal properties.  On the other hand, I
don't know how these folks would explain the dubiousness of my comments 
about the taste of marijuana, since there is presumably nothing wrong with
my sense, reference, or causal properties.


