From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!torn!utcsri!newsflash.concordia.ca!uunet!secapl!Cookie!frank Fri Oct 30 15:18:11 EST 1992
Article 7438 of comp.ai.philosophy:
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Path: newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!torn!utcsri!newsflash.concordia.ca!uunet!secapl!Cookie!frank
>From: frank@Cookie.secapl.com (Frank Adams)
Subject: Re: We've Been Tricked- consciousness
Message-ID: <1992Oct29.163746.79788@Cookie.secapl.com>
Date: Thu, 29 Oct 1992 16:37:46 GMT
References: <Bwsqpo.8EE@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu> <1992Oct28.163845.122707@Cookie.secapl.com> <BwurqA.KI6@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu>
Organization: Security APL, Inc.
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In article <BwurqA.KI6@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu> lcarr@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (lincoln carr) writes:
>In article <1992Oct28.163845.122707@Cookie.secapl.com> frank@Cookie.secapl.com (Frank Adams) writes:
>>More likely, there will any number of generations where your attempts to
>>apply your criteria will give indeterminate or inconsistent results.
>>That is, either you will get "can't tell" as the answer, or you will
>>sometimes get "yes" and sometimes "no" for the same being.
>>
>>Every real world property I can think of behaves this way.  "Alive",
>>"taller than 6 feet", whatever.  The vast majority of cases may be
>>clearly defined, but if you look hard you can find borderline cases.  It
>>is really a radical suggestion that consciousness might be different,
>>and I see no reason to think it is true.
>
>Why do I have to resist the claim that the same being might sometimes
>meet criteria and other times not?  If I were, say, to sustain a
>stroke from an overload of philosophical debate, I could become
>subrational.  The same being, I, would at one time have been rational
>and at another subrational.  The same idea applies to "alive" and
>"taller than 6 feet."  I still see no problem with minima the meeting
>of which is either yes or no.

Sorry, that isn't the kind of problem I am thinking about.  I am assuming
that the entity does *not* significantly change -- just that you have
reached the limits of your ability to measure.  If you have a piece of wood
very close to 2 meters long, if you measure it with great precision, you
will sometimes get a measurement slightly longer than 2 meters, and
sometimes slightly shorter.  The problem is intrinsic -- if you make your
measuring apparatus better, I will just stipulate that the stick is that
much closer to exactly 2 meters.  Eventually you get down to the atomic
level, where it isn't even clear what exactly the length means.

I'm arguing that for every distinction you can make that says "this is in,
and this is out", there are potential cases on the borderline.


