From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!torn!cs.utexas.edu!uunet!secapl!Cookie!frank Fri Oct 30 15:18:00 EST 1992
Article 7426 of comp.ai.philosophy:
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Path: newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!torn!cs.utexas.edu!uunet!secapl!Cookie!frank
>From: frank@Cookie.secapl.com (Frank Adams)
Subject: Re: Human intelligence vs. Machine intelligence
Message-ID: <1992Oct28.181124.135747@Cookie.secapl.com>
Date: Wed, 28 Oct 1992 18:11:24 GMT
References: <1992Oct24.144617.20159@oracorp.com>
Organization: Security APL, Inc.
Lines: 19

In article <1992Oct24.144617.20159@oracorp.com> daryl@oracorp.com (Daryl McCullough) writes:
>First, let's get away from talk about statements (which makes people
>use words like "meta-reference") and stick to a discussion of strings
>of words. [...]
>
>Okay, now consider a self-referential sentence G0: `Diagonalizing this
>sentence produces a string of words that will never be believed by
>David Chalmers'. If we diagonalize G0 we get the following long and
>complicated sentence (call it G):
>
>`Diagonalizing `Diagonalizing this sentence produces a string of words
>that will never be believed by David Chalmers.' produces a string of words
>that will never be believed by David Chalmers.'
>
>Now what exactly does G say?

You can't talk about what G *says* if you are only considering it as a
string of words.  You are explicitly talking about what it as a statement,
about it what it refers to, when you do this.


