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Article 7412 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: danco@titan.ucc.umass.edu (DANIEL F COHEN)
Subject: Re: We've Been Tricked- consciousness
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References: <BwL6LM.CL1@gpu.utcs.utoronto.ca> <BwpHGD.EMy@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu> <1316@tdat.teradata.COM>
Date: Tue, 27 Oct 1992 23:11:03 GMT
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In article <1316@tdat.teradata.COM> swf@tdat.teradata.com (Stanley Friesen) writes:
>In article <BwpHGD.EMy@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu> lcarr@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (lincoln carr) writes:
>|
>|On rethinking your claims a bit more, I can see how you could define
>|"consciousness" in such a way that it would come in degrees, like,
>|say, intelligence.  However, it seems that the burden falls upon you
>|to support such a claim just as I have been trying to support my
>|two-valued consciousness = apperception claim.  Why is this untenable?
>
>I rather suspect that even what you call apperception can come in degrees.
>
>That is the scope and detail of the data on perception that are maintained
>could vary from nil to far more even than humans maintain.
>Much like other senses/sensations can vary in degree - 'sight' can vary from
>a very minimal "there is light over there" to the detailed image formation
>of humans and eagles.
>-- 
>sarima@teradata.com			(formerly tdatirv!sarima)
>  or
>Stanley.Friesen@ElSegundoCA.ncr.com

How can apperception come in degrees?  It seems to me that one is either
aware of one's existence as a perceiving entity, or one is not -- two
possible states with a clear division between them.

I can't conceive of any such thing as partial self-awareness. It might be 
argued that an entity might not be fully self-aware in that he does not
know and understand every aspect of his consciousness (as is certainly
the case with human beings), or that he is mistaken as to the nature of
his own consciousness (as is also very likely the case with humans), but, 
in either case, he is still self-aware.

What am I missing here?


Dan Cohen
danco@philos.umass.edu
danco@titan.ucc.umass.edu


