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Article 7407 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: burt@aupair.cs.athabascau.ca (Burt Voorhees)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Simulated Brain
Message-ID: <burt.720222735@aupair.cs.athabascau.ca>
Date: 27 Oct 92 21:52:15 GMT
References: <1992Oct13.085347.13831@klaava.Helsinki.FI> <g87wsB1w165w@CODEWKS.n
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>In article <1992Oct19.133435.18702@klaava.Helsinki.FI> amnell@klaava.Helsinki.
FI (Marko Amnell) writes:
>>I don't know how many participants in the discussion would agree with
>>me, but any workable definition of consciousness would have to go beyond
>>mere cognition -- the capacity for thought, something like purposeful
>>use of information to achieve results (to just give a sketch) -- and
>>include sensory awareness of one's environment, self-awareness of
>>oneself as a thinking being, a history of interaction with similar
>>beings (something repeatedly stressed by Davidson in his criticism of
>>the Turing Test) and hence membership in a community of thinkers.
>>All this is not meant to be a real definition, but just something to
>>start the ball rolling, if anyone would care to push it further.

>Why would consciousness need to be this broad?  For example, if all of
>my external senses were destroyed and all that I could do is
>apperceive, I would still be conscious.  Also, if I were abandoned on
>a desert island with no interaction with other sentient life from
>birth and survived somehow, I would still be conscious.  So, the only
>part of your definition with with I agree and the only part that I
>think is necessary to define consciousness is self-awareness of
>oneself as a thinking being.

This is self-consciousness.  Seems to me that there is a distinction
which needs to be made between self-consciousness and consciousness
(itself).  Given that we can ask what sort of material basis is
required in order to produce a mechanism or organism which has the
possibility of becomming self-conscious.
For example, it it possible to do this on the basis of formal algorithmic
structures alone?
My own preference is to go back to Parmenides and define consciousness
as "that which is"; or in more modern form, the field within which
distinctions occur (hence, itself, beyond any possible distinction).
Then, within the set of distinctions which do occur, certain
information processing structures appear and, in some cases, self-organize
into a closed system which generates a structure of self.  Self-
consciousness happens when consciousness becomes identified with
the self structure.  (Shades of intentionality!)
Question still remains as to whether or not this could be done with
formal algorithms.  Certainly it requires self-referential processes
and the final step, like the lightening bolt that animated Frankenstein
would certainly seem to be non algorithmic.  But one could still
assert that although non-algorithmic it would always happen under
the right set of circumstances.  Personally I think Lazurus Long had
it right: "Those computers with awareness potential but without
awareness are that way because nobody bothered to love the poor things."
bv


