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Article 7392 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: lcarr@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (lincoln carr)
Subject: Re: We've Been Tricked- consciousness
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Date: Mon, 26 Oct 1992 01:57:49 GMT
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In article <BwL6LM.CL1@gpu.utcs.utoronto.ca> pindor@gpu.utcs.utoronto.ca (Andrzej Pindor) writes:
>an infant dog. It is only in the process of development, through interaction
>with environment, does it gradually achieve a state of consciousness,
>presumably a s a result of developments in its brain capacities. I wonder
>what evidence the people who talk about consciousenss being a two-valued 
>category (yes or no) have for a consciousness of very young infants?
>Except for a blind belief, an idea of integer number of conscioussneses (?)
>in the Universe seems untenable.
>


On rethinking your claims a bit more, I can see how you could define
"consciousness" in such a way that it would come in degrees, like,
say, intelligence.  However, it seems that the burden falls upon you
to support such a claim just as I have been trying to support my
two-valued consciousness = apperception claim.  Why is this untenable?
-- 
Lincoln R. Carr, Computer Scientist-Philosopher    lcarr@silver.ucs.indiana.edu
"Treat all rational autonomous moral agents, whether in the form of yourself
or another, never as means solely, but always as ends in themselves."
                  Immanuel Kant, from "Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals"


