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Article 7325 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: cam@castle.ed.ac.uk (Chris Malcolm)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Simulated Brain
Message-ID: <26987@castle.ed.ac.uk>
Date: 18 Oct 92 16:19:39 GMT
References: <1992Oct14.152444.21325@meteor.wisc.edu> <1992Oct14.180354.8129@spss.com> <1992Oct14.221625.28631@meteor.wisc.edu>
Organization: Edinburgh University
Lines: 65

In article <1992Oct14.221625.28631@meteor.wisc.edu> tobis@meteor.wisc.edu (Michael Tobis) writes:

>Again, especially since the scientific method rejects subjective evidence, 
>applying the scientific method to subjective phenomena is not guaranteed to 
>work.

This is a rather confused statement. Music is subjective, and applying
the scientific method to investigating its various aspects has both
improved our musical capabilities and our understanding of it.

>Most of you folks seem to think that the scientific method invariably 
>succeeds, and that, while it may elude us at present, a scientific explanation
>of consciousness must in principle exist.

How do you tell the difference between this point of view, and the
following: "The scientific method often succeeds, and since scientific
investigations of mental phenomena are proving very fruitful,
clearly we should continue with the enterprise of trying to explain
mind scientifically."

>I claim that this assertion is as 
>unsupported as its contrary.

How do you support this claim? As far as explaining mental phenomena
are concerned, the scientists have a good track record, and their rate
of progress seems to be improving. What balances this on the other side?

>So, whether or not (as Dennett seems to claim) consciousness is explained,

Dennett doesn't claim this, as you would know if you'ld read the back
of the book cover as well as the title.

>most of the people here seem convinced that such an explanation is possible
>in principle.

I think you greatly exaggerate. It is perfectly sensible to struggle
to achieve something which you think _might_ be possible. The
explicability of consciousness follows in principle from scientific
materialism. It is true that there are some who are personally totally
committed, as an act of faith, to scientific materialism. There are
far more who espouse it contingently simply because it currently seems
to be the most profitable game in town.

>At least my belief [in the inexplicability of consciousness] is
>falsifiable: come up with an explanation
>that isn't just handwaving and I will concede the point.

You are very generous: I'ld want to see a _demonstration_.

As to the falsifiability of the assertion that consciousness is
explicable in material terms, this follows logically from scientific
materialism, which simply assumes that _everything_ is so explicable.
You can't expect to prove (or falsify) one of the assumptions of a
system from within that system. In this case the falsification (if it
happens) would be the result of the agreed bankruptcy of the research
programme predicated on it. In other words, the failure of science.

Now, perhaps you'ld like to explain just what research programme you
think should be mounted to try to prove your contention that
consciousness is inexplicable? Can you think of a better one than
trying to explain it?
-- 
Chris Malcolm    cam@uk.ac.ed.aifh          +44 (0)31 650 3085
Department of Artificial Intelligence,    Edinburgh University
5 Forrest Hill, Edinburgh, EH1 2QL, UK                DoD #205


