From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!torn!utcsri!rpi!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!wupost!uunet!tdat!swf Mon Oct 19 16:59:42 EDT 1992
Article 7320 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: swf@teradata.com (Stanley Friesen)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Ginsberg & Human intelligence vs. Machine intelligence
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Date: 16 Oct 92 22:00:03 GMT
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In article <Bw62rC.5I@unx.sas.com> sasmsr@zinfande.unx.sas.com (Mark S. Riggle) writes:
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|
|Of course it's speculation; any hypothesis is speculation and this includes
|the strong AI hypothsis. Occam's razor is a reasonable procedure to apply
|to competing hypothsises and that is what you try to do in the second part.
|However, I think it's applied incorrectly here since Penrose's hypothesis
|also attempts to explain some odd quantum phenomena concerning the place of
|consciousness which the strong AI hypothesis does not. So in the broader
|picture, the 'Penrose hypothesis' is the simpler of the two.

I would not apply it this way.  Penrose adds assumptions about the nature
of quantum uncertainty that are not normally present in either AI or physics
research.  He also adds the rather dubious assumption of a *relationship*
between the two, and give no more support for it than 'it might be'.

Most serious AI researchers are basing thier work largely on the results
from the cognitive sciences (neurology, psychology and so on), so they do
have an evidentiary base for thier work that is lacking in Penrose' musings.

So, I see alot of problem with treating the speculation as the main *argument*
in Penrose.  I see no reason to pay much attention to it without supporting
evidence.  Neurology is finding out how brain operation correlates with
mental activity, so there seems little need, at present, to even *look*
for additional mechanisms (at least at this early date). And the history of
science has shown over and over that humanity does *not* have a special place
in the Universe, and thus any concept which purports to give us one requires
extra evidence in its favor to be even considered.

|In the Strong AI vs. Weak AI hypothsis arguements, it is easy to forget the
|very special treatment of consciousness in quantum physics and that it
|should be accounted for.

The point is that I do not think this is anything except a mark of our
ignorance about quantum phenomena.  I seriously question all interpretations
of QM that give humanity a special status with regard to the universe.

Until we know more about QM, I do not think using it in this way is anything
except argument from ingorance - a singularly invalid form of argument.

|So Penrose does does provide the NEED of the
|proposed mechanism. It is just not in terms of the part it plays in
|providing consciousness which is what you had wanted.

No, he doesn't, he shows that under *one* interpretation of QM, there is
a need for some special relation between consciousness and QM.  Under other
interpretations this special status goes away, and thus, so does the need
for an 'explanation'.

-- 
sarima@teradata.com			(formerly tdatirv!sarima)
  or
Stanley.Friesen@ElSegundoCA.ncr.com


