From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!torn!utcsri!rpi!think.com!ames!haven.umd.edu!uunet!tdat!swf Mon Oct 19 16:59:41 EDT 1992
Article 7318 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: swf@teradata.com (Stanley Friesen)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Brain and Mind (was: Logic and God)
Message-ID: <1260@tdat.teradata.COM>
Date: 16 Oct 92 18:14:49 GMT
References: <1992Oct8.230422.5045@hilbert.cyprs.rain.com> <1992Oct9.040228.2117@meteor.wisc.edu> <1250@tdat.teradata.COM> <1992Oct14.225558.29323@meteor.wisc.edu>
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In article <1992Oct14.225558.29323@meteor.wisc.edu> tobis@meteor.wisc.edu (Michael Tobis) writes:
|
|>Bah!  Then claiming that life is an emergent property of certain chemical
|>processes is a form of animism!
|
|So what? I did not claim that Searle's argument was an argument against
|animism, but people have claimed that the systems reply was a defense of 
|materialism, which it is not. It may be consistent with some sort of monism,
|but certainly not a materialistic one, and hence I would venture, not
|plausibly emergent from purely physical principles.

But how is emergence consistant with materialism with respect to life
and nor with respect to mind?  What is the difference *logically* speaking.
[Differences in current epistemic status are irrelevant to the *philosophical*
validity of the position].

|>Emergence is merely the claim that for analysis to procede an additional
|>elevel of abstraction is necessary.  Microlevel analysis of neural
|>function does not reveal consciousness, it is the higher level *interactions*
|>of the nueral operations that do reveal it.  (No more than life is found
|>by studying the reaction of individual enzymes in a test tube).
|
|Well, it seems to me that breathing is an emergent property of the physical
|world: we can define cells from structures of biochemical stuff, organs
|from cells, and functions of the organs from energy exchanges or oxygen
|fluxes thorugh boundaries that can objectively be defined. But mind
|is different from breathing in that we have no way of defining mind in
|terms of the physical properties of the brain. Like trying to extract 
|diatonic music from the axioms of ZF, the categories are incommensurable.

Are you saying music is *not* an emergent phenomenon?
True - the particular scale we use is not intrinsic in the physical world,
but then neither is the form which lif has taken here on Earth.  It is
precisely this independence of phenomena at the different levels that
*requires* treatment at different levels.  Studying biology at the level of
physics is just as absurd as trying to study music through abstract
mathematics.  Biological facts are, in general, only losely constrained
by physics, so they must be studied in thier own right, not derived from
first principles.  It is *this* feature of life that leads me to use the
term 'emergent' for it.  If all facts about life were derivable from the
principles and findings of physics, then there would be no emergent level
to study, and biology could simply be absorbed into physics.

So, now on the level of evidence, what reason do you have, other than
*current* lack of comprehensive models, to conclude that mental processes
are not ultimately physical?  How is the current state of mental science
any different than the state of biology two centuries ago?  (when animism
was still considered a viable theory).

|Thus we have no way of knowing whether
|mind exists outside ourselves, save by analogy to ourselves and intuitive
|judgement. This used to be just a cute philosophical quandary, but now that
|Turing-test passing algorithms are seriously in prospect, and now
|that people are proposing that Turing-test algorithms should have rights
|it is a serious practical question.

We *currently* have no way of knowing, but argument from ignorance has a way
of evaporating as science advances.  Two centuries ago it was almost in-
concievable that life could be based purely on chemical reactions (as they
were then understood), but that is now universally accepted as an established
fact.  Why should mental activity be any different?  Why should the current
problems be anything other than ignorance?

|>As a trained biologist (one of the few in this news group), I see *no*
|>such discontinuity.  Quite the contrary, I find no place where I can
|>identify any sharp break along the continuum from non-life to human life.
|
|There is no objective break, but it certainly seems likely that there is
|an unverifiable break between things that have an experience and things 
|that don't.

Not to me.  One of the lessons I have learned from biology is that sharp
breaks usually are illusions rather than realities.  Even species boundaries,
one of the most sharply defined things in biology, are not always clear
and precise.

Thus, given my experience as a biologist, and the way I have learned life
operates, I find the idea of a break of the sort you are talking about
to be inconsistant with the principles of life.

The continual discovery of new similarities between humans and various
other animals, even in areas where we usually consider ourselves unique,
tends, in my mind, to confirm this.

|>It sounds like there is nothing you would accept as evidence of consciousness
|>If so, I doubt you will ever accept anything other than humans as conscious.
|
|Yes, I believe that the only test possible is the so-called Turing Test, i.e.,
|just plain guessing. I think to design a purely algorithmic Turing Test
|passer is precisely to design a system that will make us guess that
|somebody's home when nobody is. I do not know whether this is possible.
|I suspect it is possible but fervently hope that it is not.
|
|However, I accept mammals and birds as conscious in the metaphysically
|interesting sense, that is to say, I believe they have an experience.
|This is just a guess, though. Fortunately, no one is offering voting
|rights to chickens just yet, so it is not an important policy question.

The policy issue *does* come up where extra-terrestrials are concerned.
True, we are no more in contact with ET's than we have true AI's at present,
but I see both as a real possiblity, eventually.  Much of the policy decisions
need to be anticipated to avoid serious, dangerous mistakes - like the
old idea that Blacks are not humans).

|>So, what *evidence* would you require to accept a being from another planet
|>was conscious?  How would you distinguish a 'real' aliem from a perfect
|>'android' type robot?  
|
|I dunno. Beats the hell out of me. Hopefully they would not try to immigrate
|to our turf and we could avoid the issue.

Wouldn't count on it.  Did the Europeans stay out of North America?

|>(For that matter, is the distinction even meaningful)?
|
|Yes, yes, a googol times yes! It is the most important distinction around!
|
|Unfortunately, it is meaningful only outside pure science because the
|existence of subjective experience is not objectively verifiable. That is why
|(I guess) some people whose faith in the scientific method goes beyond the
|robustness of its conclusions (with which I fully agree) to the completeness
|of its possible conclusions (which I doubt) are willing to make the bizarre
|assertion that consciousness is some sort of illusion. Just who or what is
|being deceived???
|
I am not making *that* assertion.  My current *guess* (educated) is that it
will turn out to me a higher level phenomenon, related to neurology in the
same way life is related to chemistry.  I base this on the prior history
of similar situations in other branches of science, and on the speed with
which the neurological mechanisms of thought are currently being elucidated.
[Results like the downloading of recognition criteria to the olfactory bulb
are major breakthroughs, and provide considerable insight into the higher
levels of brain operation].
-- 
sarima@teradata.com			(formerly tdatirv!sarima)
  or
Stanley.Friesen@ElSegundoCA.ncr.com


