From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!torn!cs.utexas.edu!swrinde!gatech!ukma!rutgers!uwvax!meteor!tobis Mon Oct 19 16:59:01 EDT 1992
Article 7261 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: tobis@meteor.wisc.edu (Michael Tobis)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Simulated Brain
Message-ID: <1992Oct14.033233.14444@meteor.wisc.edu>
Date: 14 Oct 92 03:32:33 GMT
References: <1992Oct12.220803.15594@news.media.mit.edu> <26864@castle.ed.ac.uk> <1992Oct14.023633.14791@news.media.mit.edu>
Organization: University of Wisconsin, Meteorology and Space Science
Lines: 39

>>>>>> On 12 Oct 92 22:40:08 GMT, minsky@media.mit.edu (Marvin Minsky) said:

>> In other words, does Searle suggest any reason why the mind-stuff is
>> secreted by the hydrocarbons -- rather than the equally plausible
>> (and more widely believed) hypothesis that the breath of life comes
>> directly from the Good Lord?

No, nor does anyone propose any reason why subjective experience "emerges"
by some wierd coincidence from algorithmic processing, independent of
the nature of the platform, although this bizarre hypothesis has its
adherents as well. Unfortunately, none of these hypotheses is testable,
and all have equal standing in science, that is, virtually nil. Or should
have equal standing, anyway.

In article <1992Oct14.023633.14791@news.media.mit.edu> minsky@media.mit.edu (Marvin Minsky) writes:

>I'm still having trouble.  This seems to say that a computer could
>think, with the right program, but not _solely_ by virtue of being a
>computer with the right sort of program? So there must be another
>secret ingredient, e.g., the virtue of sentience or, let's say, a
>soul.  I see no reason to consider this more seriously than any other
>religious or vitalistic bit of dogma.  Do you disagree?  Why can't I
>insist that a Boojum is necessary as well.

Um, but I have no need to postulate a Boojum; I AM a Boojum. There is
no reasonable level of abstraction from objective phenomena to subjective
ones. Hence, there is a consistent phenomenon inaccessible to objective
science, and objective science is necessarily an incomplete model of the
universe.

>On second thought, I think I better postulate two Boojums.  Otherwise
>what would we say if Searle declares that thinking cannot occur
>_solely_ by virtue of a single Boojum?

:-) Gee, I wish you people weren't all so clever and charming. I mean
this quite without sarcasm. It would be easier to oppose you tooth and
nail if I didn't actually like you and suspect you had Boojums.

mt


